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Abstract 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a territorial and ethnic conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan  over  the  disputed  region  of  Nagorno-Karabakh  that  has  led  to  war, 
displacement,  trauma and  continuing  animosities.  This  thesis  examines  the  differential 
long-term effects  of the conflict  in the lives of Internally  Displaced Persons (IDP) and 
refugees from Armenia,  Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh who have remained largely 
excluded from current  peacebuilding  initiatives.  Ethnographic  fieldwork and interviews 
were conducted with displaced and refugee women and with queers in Sumgayit and Baku 
in Azerbaijan and around Tbilisi in Georgia. The research uses an intersectional sensibility 
to explore the constitution and effects of economic hardship, ill-health and social exclusion 
as well the militarization in the life histories and everyday experiences of IDP and refugee 
women and queers. On this basis, it reflects what their participation, insights and concerns 
could contribute to the stalled peace processes and what cultural and societal changes will 
be required for peacebuilding and a more lasting resolution of this frozen conflict.
Key  words:  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict,  gender,  ethnicity,  intersectionality, 
peacebuilding, militarization, queer community, IDP and refugee women
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The Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict is a territorial and ethnic conflict between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan  over  the  disputed  region  of  Nagorno-Karabakh and seven  surrounding 
districts, which are de facto controlled by the self-declared Republic of Artsakh but are 
internationally recognized as  de jure part of Azerbaijan (Cornell, 1999).  Between 1988 
and 1994 the armed conflict has led to over 20 000 casualties and displaced almost one and 
a half million people: Internally Displaced Persons1 (IDPs) and refugees2 not only from the 
region of NK, but as a ripple effect of the hostilities also from Armenia and Azerbaijan 
(Selimovic et al., 2012). Even though the first peacebuilding initiatives started in the early 
1990s  (Najafizadeh,  2013),  the  NK  conflict  still  remains  a  ‘frozen  conflict’ among 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh where ‘frozen’ refers to a situation in which 
active armed conflict has been ended but hostilities continue.
Since my childhood the NK conflict has reverberated in Azerbaijani society in the form of 
mistrust, hate, and the conception of Armenians as an enemy. When I started to travel as a 
student and attend conferences in Europe and met Armenians,  I realized that Armenians 
were  just  as  friendly,  helpful,  trustworthy  and  emotional  as  Azerbaijanis.  As  a  queer 
researcher from Azerbaijan, the militarization of the Azerbaijani society  and mandatory 
military service have negatively shaped my life and thus, on an academic level, I aim to 
understand and analyse the experiences of other marginalised and queer people concerning 
NK conflict  and militarization.  This informed the focus on the under-researched issues 
such as gender, ethnicity, IDP and refugee women and queer community in the context of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  The work is  fuelled  by the  belief  that  the  underprivileged 
experiences of IDP and refugee women and queer community can inform and contribute to 
resolving the NK conflict in a peaceful way. 
One of the important reasons for considering peacebuilding  is its continuing significance 
in the current frozen peace negotiations among  the governments of  Armenia, Azerbaijan 
1 Internally  Displace  Persons  stay  within  their  own  country  and  remain  under  the  protection  of  its 
government, even if  the government is the reason for displacement. They often move to areas where it is 
difficult to deliver humanitarian help and they are among the most vulnerable in the world (UNHCR, 2019).
2 A refugee  is someone who has  been forced  to flee his  or  her  country because  of persecution,  war or  
violence. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious 
violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries (UNHCR, 2018).
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and Nagorno Karabakh. For more than thirty years, people have been living in uncertainty 
and often precarity while in recent years the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan have 
increased their  military  spending  (Mutschler,  2017). This  can be considered an indirect 
sign for gradually stopping the peace negotiations and resolving the conflict with military 
means. To contribute to preventing such events, I aim to focus on the visions of the peace 
process  by  reflecting  it  from the  perspectives  of  IDP and  refugee  women  and  LGBT 
(Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) /queer3 community.
The  importance  of  considering  gender  relations  in  peacebuilding  has  been  recognised 
internationally. In 2000 the UN Security Council adopted  the  resolution S/RES/1325 on 
women and peace and security. The document confirms the vital  role of women in the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts, negotiation processes, peacebuilding in post-conflict 
situations and emphasises the significance of women’s equal involvement in efforts for 
protection  and advocating  of  peace  and security  (Reimann,  2014).  Despite  the  plea  to 
increase  the  participation  of  women  and incorporate  gender  perspectives  in  peace  and 
security efforts Armenia and Azerbaijan still do not have a National Action Plan (NAP) for 
the  implementation  of  UNSCR 1325.  NAPs are  official  documents  defining  policy  of 
countries  to  comply  with  the  Women,  Peace  and  Security  objectives:  women’s 
participation,  conflict  prevention,  post-conflict  peacebuilding  and  other  relevant  peace 
processes (Trojanowska, 2015). Partly as a result of weakening formal peace negotiations 
of  the NK conflict,  attention  to  women and issues  of  gender  and sexuality  have  been 
largely absent (Selimovic 2012). To date little is known about the lives and concerns of 
refugee and internally displaced people and those who identify as lesbian, gay, queer or 
transgender  and their  experience  and  insights  and experience  for peacebuilding.  In the 
context  of  the  NK  conflict,  the  lives  of  IDP  and  refugee  women  and  LGBT/queer 
community  have  not  been  investigated  in  depth  by  international  and  local  scholars. 
Therefore, the life stories of these marginalized  people are not accessible in international 
western journals. This is one of the signs which indicate how the topic still remains under-
researched among feminist scholars.
It is these minoritized people who are at the centre of this thesis that explores the role of 
the  Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the lives of IDP and refugee women and queers from 
Armenia,  Azerbaijan  and  Nagorno-Karabakh.  I  examine  the  differential  effects  of  this 
3 Even though, as a researcher I am against actively using terms such as  ‘LGBT’, I shall use these terms in 
order to represent the current situation of the region.
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conflict  from  an  intersectional  perspective  that  focuses  on  the  interrelations  between 
gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic status. I am particularly interested in how Armenian 
and Azerbaijani IDP and refugee women and LGBT/queers might be differently affected 
and how these effects contribute to their exclusion from the current peace processes? How 
might more inclusionary peace processes in the context of NK conflict be enabled? 
The thesis is organised around the following four questions: First,  in what ways  are  the 
lives of Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakh displaced women differentially impacted by 
the ongoing conflict? How are their socioeconomic and health conditions  intersectionally 
constituted  by  gender  and  ethnicity?  Second,  does  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict 
influence the lives of the LGBT/queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan? How might 
the militarization of society shape gender, class and ethnicity differently? Third, why and 
how are IDP and refugee women and LGBT/queer community excluded from the current 
peacebuilding initiatives? And fourth, how does the peace process have to be re-imagined 
and  re-designed  to  take  the  intersectional  experiences  and  positionalities  of  IDP  and 
refugee women and queer community into account? 
In addressing these questions, I use intersectionality as an analytical tool. The heuristic 
assumption  is  that  an  intersectional  sensibility  will  help  to  address  the  contradictory 
constitution of the current peace processes. The concept of intersectionality builds on the 
conception of intersectionality by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991) who conceives 
intersectionality as a form of oppression  that  ‘promotes  inequalities at the personal level 
and division at the social level’ (p. 1242). The concept of intersectionality has emerged as 
a significant concept to understanding the complex levels of discrimination and exclusion 
in  a  society  whose  members  with  complex  racial,  gender,  or  sexual  identities  can 
experience bias in multiple ways (ibid). 
In line with the research questions,  the thesis is structured as follows: the first chapter  
reviews  the  literature  on  the  Nagorno-Karabakh conflict  and the  role  of  ethnicity  and 
gender, lays out a literature review of the thesis, grounded in theories of gender, ethnicity, 
peacebuilding and intersectionality. The chapter introduces an intersectional approach to 
the NK conflict for understanding gender, ethnicity and peace as intersecting categories in 
the context of NK conflict. 
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The second chapter focuses on the research design and methodology by detailing the field 
sites,  the research  participants  and  methods deployed. The chapter  also  reflects on  the 
positionality of the researcher and, the experience and challenges of my fieldwork. 
The third chapter analyses the long-term impacts of the NK conflict on the lives of my IDP 
and refugee women participants by taking their intersecting subject positions into account. 
I  uncover  to  what  extent  the  lives  of  Armenian,  Azerbaijani  and  Karabakh  women 
participants  are  still  impacted  by  the  ongoing  conflict  and  how  it  influences  their 
socioeconomic conditions from the intersectional perspectives. I examine the precarious 
living conditions by analysing cultural discrimination, social support, ill-health conditions 
and militarization as the main categories in this chapter. The reluctance or inability to talk 
about sexual violence also is addressed and I explore the reasons behind this silence. 
The fourth chapter turns to the challenges which the militarization and NK conflict brought 
to  the  lives  of  queer  community  in  Armenia  and Azerbaijan.  I  examine  the  modes of 
discrimination   in the lives of the queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this 
context, I analyse the current situation of queer community in the context of militarization 
of  society:  the  economic  repercussions  of  not  serving  in  the  military and  the 
heteronormative ideology of pronatalist policies as population growth. I show how these 
concepts reinforce the exclusion of queer community in the peace processes and increase 
hate against them in Armenian and Azerbaijani societies.
The  final chapter  seeks  to  uncover  the  male-dominated  peace  resolution  and  its 
exclusionary practices against  working class  IDP and refugee women and queers in the 
current  peace  processes.  I  aim to analyse on what  basis  IDP,  and refugee women and 
queers are excluded and how this negatively influence the current dynamics of the NK 
conflict.  The  chapter  culminates  in  suggestions  for  re-designing the  current  peace 
initiatives by considering the needs of participants for establishing more inclusionary peace 
processes. The main findings of the thesis are summarized in the Conclusion which also 
proposes ideas for further research.
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Chapter 1: State of the Art: Gender, Ethnicity and 
Peacebuilding in Nagorno-Karabakh
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, feminist theorists have renewed their involvement with matters of gender 
and peacebuilding by engaging work undertaken in the social sciences and conducting new 
empirical  research.  Women and their  life stories became a significant  issue in feminist 
scholarships  on  peacebuilding  even  though  the  conflicts  of  former  Soviet  states  and 
Eastern Europe are less investigated (see, for example, Reimann 2014; Kvinna till Kvinna 
2019). The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh (NK) has also been rarely researched by feminist 
scholars. Existing research is dispersed among the NGO reports, newspaper and website 
articles and only limited amount of academic papers published on the western journals. 
There is a lack of public awareness relating to the IDP and refugee women’s peace agenda 
which  mainly  refers  to  the  feminist  peace  and  revolution  (Caucasus  Edition,  2014). 
Therefore,  this chapter gathers the existing literature on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
with  a  particular  focus  on  whether  and  how gender,  ethnicity  and  peacebuilding  are 
conceptualized  and  attended  to.  The  chapter  will  then  introduce  the  concept  of 
intersectionality which has not been profoundly investigated in the existing literature. This 
thesis  contributes  to  filling  these  gaps  in  the  existing  literature  of  Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict  by  examining  the  interwoven  relations  of  gender,  ethnicity,  socioeconomic 
conditions, peacebuilding and other relevant factors.
Analysing  the  interrelations  between  gender  and  peacebuilding  through  ethnicity,  as  a 
specific category, into the study will assist me to investigate this ‘frozen conflict’ in more 
depth. I start by analysing the construction of ethnicity and the power relations through 
which it is constituted before reviewing the literature on gender and sexualities in light 
of the inequalities and power relations in the South Caucasus. I proceed with the role of 
gender and ethnicity in peacebuilding by analysing the current dynamics and then, the final 
section outlines an intersectional perspective on peacebuilding that will guide the empirical 
research.
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1.2 Ethnic differences and inequalities of power in Armenia and Azerbaijan
Nagorno Karabakh was established as an  oblast4, in 1923, within the Azerbaijan Soviet 
Socialist  Republic  (SSR)  (Cornell,  1999).  Azerbaijan  claims  until  the  end of  the  XIX 
century,  Armenians  or  local  Albanian  Christians  made  up  only  10  %  of  the  entire 
population in Karabakh (Ahmadov, 2012). Azerbaijani historians and politicians claim that 
before the beginning of the 20th century,  there were only five villages  in Karabakh in 
which some Armenians lived with Caucasian Christian Albanians (ibid). However, there 
were many attempts of ethnic cleansing of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh by Soviet 
officials and in 1988 when the conflict started, Azerbaijani people were deported from NK. 
At that time, the distribution of the population was 145,593 Armenians (76.4%) and 42,871 
Azerbaijanis (22.4%) (ibid). 
In the wake of Gorbachev’s policies of democratization, Karabakh Armenians requested 
the  re-establishment  of  Nagorno-Karabakh  under  the  governance  of  Armenia 
(Shahnazarian  and  Ziemer,  2012).  Historically,  Nagorno-Karabakh  has  been  a  part  of 
Azerbaijani territories, but Armenians and Azerbaijanis have lived together for centuries 
(Waal,  2005).  In  1988,  deputies  of  Armenia  in  local  Soviet  Assembly  of  Nagorno-
Karabakh  voted  for  uniting  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  with  Soviet  Armenia.  After  this 
referendum,  Azerbaijanis  committed  Sumgait  Armenian  Pogrom against  the  Armenian 
population of Sumgayit (the second largest industrial city of Azerbaijan) in 1988 in which 
32 people were killed. The pogrom took place during the early stages of the Karabakh 
movement  (Waal,  2010,  p.111).  Following this  vote,  tensions  between  Armenians  and 
Azerbaijanis living in the Nagorno-Karabakh escalated into inter-ethnic violence between 
two groups (Civil Society Monitoring Report, 2014). The Nagorno Karabakh war lasted 
from 1988 to 1994 and in 1994, the ceasefire agreement was signed by both Armenian and 
Azerbaijani sides (ibid). During the war, Russia provided many guns and artilleries for 
both of these countries and in 1994, Russia attempted to initiate the first peace negotiations 
with them (ibid). This mediation failed and after the ceasefire, there were still  shooting 
incidents happening in the borders.
This  acerbated  the  social,  political  and  economic  challenges  that  the  South  Caucasus 
region  has  faced  following  their  independence  from  the  Soviet  Union  in  1991.  It  is 
important to highlight that the U.S.S.R mainly represents the power authority of Slavic 
4 Oblast was a type of administrative division in the former Soviet Union.
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nations  and  especially,  ethnic  Russians.  Therefore,  Armenians  and  Azerbaijanis  were 
considered ethnically inferior to these Slavic nations (Foxall, 2017). After the collapse of 
the Russian Tsar Empire (when Caucasian territories were under the control of the Tsar 
regime)  during  World  War  I,  the  short-lived  Transcaucasian  Democratic  Federative 
Republic was declared, constituting the present-day republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Armenia and after some time, these countries declared their independence and founded 
their own countries (Kazemzadeh, 1951). However, again in 1920 Soviet troops invaded 
these territories and these three countries became a part of Soviet Union (ibid). Therefore, 
these countries were colonized by the Tsarist Russian Empire and after this, from 1920 to 
1991 by the Soviet Union.
In order to understand the inter-ethnic tensions in this conflict, it is helpful to consider how 
ethnicity and ethnic conflict are discussed in the social sciences, not as primordial cultural 
identities but as performative processes of situated boundary drawings and re-drawings. 
This view is proposed by Stanley Tambiah (1989) and complicates the idea that ethnic 
identity simply refers to a bounded collective cultural identity in which a group of people 
proclaim that they belong to a specific group on the ground of inheritance, ancestry or the 
sharing of kinship. Tambiah suggests that ethnicity embodies two interrelated elements. 
The first element is the created myths about the blood, descent and race of that ethnic 
group  and  therefore,  these  ethnicities  identify  themselves  as  separate  social  kinds  in 
comparison with others. The second element is ethnic boundary which is volatile and as a 
result of this, ethnic groups have either assimilated or sustained their existence. This shows 
how the ethnicities  are  socially  constructed  through the norms, cultural  ideologies  and 
myths in order to bound the cultural identity of the ethnic group (ibid). 
The construction of ethnicity is thus similar to the construction of gender and sexualities: 
As  Judith  Butler  (1990)  has  argued  the enactment  and  embodiment  of  gender  is 
performative in that gender is performed through acts, gestures, and other practices. The 
same can be argued for ethnic identities where cultural norms, values, lifestyles become 
the  elements  of  performative  practices.  A dominant  anthropological  perspective  in  the 
1960s defined ethnic groups through the identification of ‘objective’ cultural traits. Barth 
and his collaborators, however, argued that although ethnic categories incorporate ‘culture’ 
this is not a simple one-to-one relationship. For Barth, cultural characters are the means by 
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which an ethnic group outlines itself, but only a selection of the entire cache of ethnic or 
cultural  fundamentals offered are organised for defining association of the ethnic group 
(Hummell,  2014, p.  49).  It  is  important  to  contextualize this  in the context  of the NK 
conflict by analysing the Armenian and Azerbaijani ethnicities. Before that, I would like to 
focus on the Tambiah’s  classification  which proposes the following classifications  that 
describe the distribution of different ethnic groups in countries:
1. Virtually  homogenous  in  ethnic  composition  (90-100%,  including 
(contemporary Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh)
2. A single overwhelmingly dominant ethnic majority (75-89%)
3. The largest ethnic group makes up 50 to 75 % of the population and there 
are several minority groups 
4. Two large dominant groups of roughly the same size 
5. Pluralistic countries composed of many ethnic groups no one or two of them 
are dominant and where not all the ethnic groups may be actively implicated 
in ethnic politics (including former U.S.S.R)
This classification questions the ideology of the nation state that refers to an area where the 
cultural boundaries largely coincide with the political boundaries. The ideal of a nation-
state is ‘state’ integrates citizens of a single ethnic stock and cultural values (Kazancigil 
and Dogan,  1994,  p.188).  Tambiah  further  highlights  that  ethnic  compositions  are  not 
stable. The changes in the ethnic composition of Armenia and Azerbaijan also suggest that 
these frames are never monolithic. This exemplifies the first category, in the past was a 
part of second and third models of Tambiah. 
Founded in 1918, Armenia (  - HayastanՀայաստան  in Armenian) is currently considered 
as  a  monoethnic  South  Caucasian  country  with  the  major  ethnic  group  called  ‘hay-
Hayastan’- 98.1% (Schulze, 2017, pp:14-7). In Tambiah’s typology, Armenia belongs in 
the  first  group  of  the  countries  that  are  virtually  homogenous  in  ethnic  composition. 
According to last census in 2011, current minority groups include Yazidis, Russians and 
Kurds  (together  1.7%).  From  the  Tambiah’s  perspectives,  Armenians  construct  their 
ethnicity in relation to their  ‘hay’ ethnic identity  (the Armenian term for 'Armenian'  is 
Hay) (Haber, M., et al. 2016). Self-identification as hay-k’ristonya (Armenian−Christian) 
is  the main manifestation of the Armenian (hay) identity  (Antonyan,  2011).  As Levon 
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Abrahamian  (2006)  explains,  “hay-k’ristonya  is  understood  by  Armenians  as  a  single 
whole,  the  two  characteristics  being  firmly  linked  by  a  hyphen.”  By  hay-k’ristonya, 
Armenians  mean  belonging  to  the  Armenian  Apostolic  Church.  However,  after  some 
historical  events  (such  as  wars,  genocides,  displacement),  the  Church  re-defined  this 
understanding and developed this ethnic identity with the support of the founded secular 
Republic  of  Armenia  in  1918 (ibid).  This  suggests  how the  ethnic  identity  is  socially 
constructed in the Armenian society through the norms of religion and it is strengthened 
through the different ideologies such as blood connections, myths and ethnic bounding.
Azerbaijan (Azərbaycan  in Azerbaijani)  similarly is  considered a virtually  homogenous 
South  Caucasian  country  with  an  overwhelmingly  dominant  ethnic  majority  called 
‘Azerbaijani’-  91.6%  (Political  Division:  Population  Size  and  Structure,  2011). 
Azerbaijanis in contrast  do not claim a common or unified ethnic identity but consider 
themselves decedents of Turks, Persians, Russians and Caucasian tribes in the region. Even 
though Azerbaijan is multi-religious country, majority of population are Muslim (Motika, 
2001). In fact, the name ‘The Republic of Azerbaijan’ and the ethnicity of Azerbaijanis can 
be considered political inventions of 1918 like Armenians (Waal, 2005). Therefore, unlike 
Hays-Armenians, Azerbaijanis do not share the common ethnic or religious roots but rather 
they  unite  around  the  idea  of  ‘The  Republic  of  Azerbaijan’.  This  also  suggests  that 
Azerbaijani identity is also a product of the 1918 which became a political construction 
after the fall of the Russian Empire. At present, Armenians share only 1.35% of the whole 
population in Azerbaijan, although in both cases their composition can be presumed to be 
higher since Armenians do not want to register their ethnicities as Armenian due to the 
armed conflict  over the territories  of Nagorno-Karabakh (State  Statistics  Committee  of 
Azerbaijan, 2009). 
The accessible statistics from 1939 show that before the WWII, as part of the Soviet Union 
both republics were more ethnically diverse. Armenia included more than 17% of other 
ethnicities,  with  the  largest  ethnic  minority  group  being  Azerbaijani  people  (10.2%), 
Azerbaijan included more than 40 % other  ethnicities  with the majority  being Russian 
(16.5%) and Armenian (12%).  
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Figure 1: Ethnic composition of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1939 (All-Union Census of 
1939)
Armenia Azerbaijan
Armenians 1 061 997 388 025
Azerbaijanis 130 896 1 870 471
Russians 51 464 528 318
Ukrainians 5 496 23 643
Georgians 652 10 196
Total 1 282 338 3 205 150
Armenia was still an overwhelmingly monoethnic country with about 17% other ethnicities 
(Tambiah’s category 2), Azerbaijan was more diverse (Tambiah’s category 3) in 1939 with 
more than 40% of other ethnicities.  One of the potential  reasons can be considered the 
economic conditions of Azerbaijan due to the well-developed oil industry of Azerbaijan 
(Ahmadov, 2012).  in these indicators.   Even during the recent years,  The World Bank 
forecasted  that  the  poverty  rate  in  Armenia  was  29.8%  in  2016  Additionally, 
unemployment  in  Armenia  is  high  and  unstable  –  18%.  Unemployment  is  mostly 
concentrated in urban areas, among the young and women (UNDP Armenia, no date). In 
Azerbaijan,  4.9  %  of  the  population  lives  below  the  national  poverty  line  (Asian 
Development Bank 2015). 
 From another perspective, the role of traditional values could play a crucial role, as well. 
Armenian  society  is  mainly  united  because  of  firstly,  their  religious  ‘hay-k’ristonya’ 
identity and secondly, their constructed political and ethnic identities. That can be one of 
the reasons to consider why Armenian society is less multicultural  in comparison with 
Azerbaijan  because  they  could  be  more  conservative  towards  ‘others’.  However, 
Azerbaijani society had only the ethnic and political identity and the economic conditions 
and  geopolitical  location  of  Baku  made  Azerbaijan  more  strategically  important  and 
ethnically multicultural country in comparison with Armenia (Waal, 2005).
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Tambiah (1989) makes clear, ethnic conflict arises from contested relations of power that 
often have been established through processes of colonialization and in the future that can 
manifest as a clash of ethnic group interests or group rights. In the context of Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, the autonomous oblast of NK was created under the rule of Azerbaijan 
SSR by the U.S.S.R in order to create an ethnic conflict in the future (Waal, 2003). In 
today’s  politics,  it  shows how the current  Armenian  and Azerbaijani  political  arena  is 
shaped by the promises of Russia and how the colonial power of Russia directly influences 
the  peace  negotiations  (Waal,  2010).  This  also  suggests  that  how Russian  policy  was 
structured by considering the fall of the U.S.S.R and the potential for future invasions of 
the region in the new era. In order to understand this issue deeply, I would like to analyse 
the figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Ethnic composition of Nagorno-Karabakh 1926-1989 (About the first population 
census of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic 2005)
Power inequality among ethnic groups refers to the power hierarchy in which one ethnic 
group holds the power and rules another ethnic group (Tambiah, 1989, pp. 340-2). In the 
figure 2,  it  is  clear  that  NK as the autonomy of the former Azerbaijan  U.S.S.R had a 
considerable  Armenian  population  (more  than  80%) in  the  1920s and more  than  70% 
during 1970s. However, the Armenian citizens of Nagorno-Karabakh were excluded in the 
social and political life of Azerbaijan SSR. The colonial politics of U.S.S.R was to locate 
the ethnic Armenian community within Azerbaijan by giving them autonomy not under the 
governance of Armenian S.S.R. (Waal, 2003). In other words, the power hierarchy and the 
access  to  the  better  living  standards  will  concern  Armenian  community  of  the  former 
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Azerbaijan U.S.S.R, in the future. Economic re-distribution and welfare support among the 
working class were not provided by the social policy schemes of the former Azerbaijan 
U.S.S.R for the Armenian community of Nagorno Karabakh (Waal, 2003). The total GDP 
of  the  former Azerbaijan  U.S.S.R was higher  in  comparison with  the former  Armenia 
U.S.S.R  (Ahmadov,  2012,  pp.  340-49). The  conceptions  of  ethnicity  by  Tambiah  and 
others,  suggest  analysing  how  these  power  relations  are  enacted  in  the  practices 
for different  people  Azerbaijani,  Armenians  and  Karabakh  Armenians.  Importantly, 
Tambiah (1989) analyses ethnic conflicts in terms of power relations and inequalities. In 
Foucauldian terms,  power relations  have multiple  origins and can only be identified in 
practice. Here it is important to note [Foucault’s idea that ‘where there is power, there is 
resistance’ can be applied to the analysis of the NK conflict as well.] that Azerbaijan SSR 
(1918-1991) did not provide equal opportunities for other ethnicities during Soviet times. 
Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh claimed that they did not have enough schools, 
libraries, theatres and other places in the NK and Azerbaijani SSR did not allow them to 
establish such places (in Armenian language) because it was seen as a threat to Azerbaijani 
SSR (ibid).  Basically,  structural  forces  such as  unequal  access  to  resources,  economic 
benefits,  or  political  power  between  Azerbaijanis  and  Karabakh  Armenians  can  be 
considered to fuel the conflict.
After the establishment of NK in 1923, ethnic conflicts were ‘resolved’ until 1988 when 
the U.S.S.R rule ended. This was accomplished by keeping the Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Nagorno-Karabakh  under  the  oppressive  communist  regime.  This  once  more  supports 
Tambiah’s argument that colonists often create ethnic divisions in terms of involving some 
groups such as politically or economically less privileged ethnic groups in administration. 
Upon  de-colonisation,  these  divisions  exacerbated  the  potential  for  ethnic  conflict 
(Tambiah,  1989,  pp.  340-2).  In  this  sense,  Tambiah  (1989)  argues  all  ethnicities  are 
constructed made and remade in specific situations rather than given.  Such divisions were 
acerbated by Soviet officials who had a vested in creating a conflict between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia over the territories of NK in order to maintain its influence in these territories 
after the collapse of U.S.S.R. The Armenian population of NK opposed Azerbaijan rule in 
1988 due  to  the  fact  that  they  had limited  rights  and responsibilities  compared  to  the 
citizens  of  Armenia.  Mainly,  the  Armenian  population  of  NK  claimed  their  cultural 
differences such as language, education, political freedom that were considered obstacles 
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to the autonomy of Azerbaijan. Therefore, a voting was organized in 1988 in order to leave 
Soviet Azerbaijan and join Soviet Armenia and after these events, the NK war started.
1.3 Gender and sexuality in the conflict and its aftermath
I would now like to turn to the conceptions of gender and sexualities from the perspectives 
of critical gender and queer studies and the role they have been accorded to conflict in 
Nagorno Karabakh. According to Judith Butler (1990), gender and sexual identities are 
cultural  corporeal  productions.  They are formed through the embodiment  of  normative 
discourse that is corporeally enacted. In other words, gender and sexuality are not somatic 
givens,  but embodied  cultural  effects.  Gender  scholars  go further  and discuss how the 
sexualities are produced through cultural norms and the power authorities such as state, 
religion  and  other  institutions  decide  how  the  cultural  patterns re-shape  gender  and 
sexuality (Halperin, 1989).
Cultures and cultural patterns can differ from a region to another one. However, sexualities 
and gender identities tend to be considered as binary opposites (homo-heterosexual, male-
female)  due  to  pervasive  cultural  encodings  of  heterosexual  reproduction  and  gender 
binaries  as  natural  and  universal  (Halperin,  1993,  p.418).  From  the  1960s  feminist 
movements in different countries contributed to changing legal and political  regulations 
such as reproductive rights, divorce rights, LGBT rights and other important changes. Even 
if  equal  liberal  rights  such  as  (white)  women’s  voting  rights  were  instituted  at  the 
beginning of the 20th century, heteronormative systems still hold power. Heteronormativity 
refers to the encompassing regime in which an individual, sexually attracted only to the 
person of opposite sex, is assumed to be a natural and universal norm or way of being 
human  (Butler,  1993).  Mostly  heteronormative  system  tends  to  confer  benefits  and 
privileges  to  the  hegemonic  and  privileged  masculinities.  At  the  same  time,  cultural 
differences and living conditions must be taken into account to show what masculinities 
are formed and how both women and nonnormative sexualities continue to be subjugated 
(DuBois,  1998,  pp.  174-6).  In  Australian  sociologist  Raeween Connell’s  (2005) terms, 
hegemonic masculinity is defined as a practice that legitimizes the dominant position of 
powerful men' in society and the subordination of other masculinities and women. Men 
who  established  the  benefits  of  patriarchy,  could  be  regarded  as  viewing  complicit 
masculinity: it was concerning this group, and compliance among heterosexual women, the 
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concept  of  hegemony  was  most  influential.  The  concept  of  hegemony  does  not  mean 
violence, although it could be reinforced by force; and dominance reached with the support 
of culture, traditions. institutions, and encouragement (Connell, 2005).
On the one hand, the Caucasus has been considered a ‘male-dominated region’ in history 
(see, for example: Tlostanova et al. 2012; Shahnazarian and Ziemer 2018). Some highlight 
that this region was ruled by hegemonic masculinities (including daily activities, social and 
economic engagements) which objectified women’s bodies and recognizes women as tools 
for producing offspring (ibid). Gender and sexuality as critical categories are among the 
problematic  and  deeply  silenced  issues  in  the  Armenian,  Azerbaijani  and  Karabakh 
societies. As Shahnazarian (2018) argues, Karabakh society is a society where women’s 
social status and welfare depend on their relationship to men. In Caucasian societies when 
women are considered subordinate  to their  husbands,  brothers,  fathers  and sons (ibid). 
Women are not allowed to take any actions without the approval of male family members. 
Women were valued as wives and mothers, but less so as daughters, who were essentially 
raised to marry and serve other families (ibid). Men’s economic and political domination 
also  constitutes  their  symbolic  power  as  carrier  of  the  family  heritage  or  bloodline 
(Connell,  2005).  In  the  South  Caucasus,  kinship  relationships  served  as  important 
resources  people  could  draw upon to  circumvent  bureaucratic  regulations  and material 
shortages  (Dudwick  2015,  p.6).  In  other  words,  this  dependency  strengthens  the  male 
power of the male-dominated region. Such conventions keep women and non-normative 
sexualities  under  the  control  of  Caucasian  hegemonic  masculinities.  In  S.  Caucasian 
cultures, mothers, wives and daughters signify the nation and national belonging (ibid) and 
they are perceived as the property of the nation.
On the other hand (to those who argue for a unitary gender order) there is a legacy of 
progressive gender equality politics.  As Tlostanova (2012) argues, when Tsarist Russia 
invaded the Caucasian territories in the XVIII-XIX century, it was forcing the integration 
into  the  Russian  Empire.  This  integration  was  the  societal  changes  that  Persian and 
Ottoman empires did not achieve when they ruled these territories. The Caucasus region 
was  opposed  to  women’s  and  representation  in  society.  In  an  effort  to  control  these 
territories, the Tsarist Russia aimed to empower women and reduced the male dominance 
in these societies (ibid). Yet, the Tsarist regime implemented women empowerment only in 
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limited  terms  such  as  property  and  economic  rights.  However,  these  changes  mainly 
targeted the wealthy and elite class of the region and the working-class women were not 
targeted in this empowerment. In the future, this triggered to increase the hate between 
women in big cities who came from wealthy families and women who were from less-
developed areas of Caucasus (Kvinna till Kvinna, 2019). After the downfall of the Russian 
empire in 1918, this region became independent and in 1920 was forced to involuntarily 
join the former U.S.S.R. Some scholars argued that socialism has contributed a lot to the 
women and queer empowerment of these regions (see, for example: Hazard 1965; Usha 
2005;  Tlostanova  2012).  In  the  1920s  intercultural  dialogue,  freedom  of  movements, 
educational and employment opportunities enabled women in the S.  Caucasus region to 
gain more independence through studying, working, socializing on an equal level to men 
(Usha,  2005, pp.143-5).  Soviet  social  services  were made available  such as  education, 
works spaces, social and political participation. As a result of these initiatives, the literacy 
rate of the women of South Caucasus increased from approximately 8.7 % in 1926 to 99% 
in 1989 (see, for example: Usha 2005; Matossian 1962). According to Hazard (1965), the 
early Soviet Union, the Communist Party eliminated many repressive Tsarist regulations in 
1917 related to sexuality: In 1917 they legalised homosexuality, and in the 1920s the law 
did not criminalize non-commercial same-sex between consenting adults. It also provided 
for  no-fault  divorce  and  legalized  abortion.  However,  outside  Russia  and  Ukraine, 
homosexuality remained a criminal offence in some Soviet republics, predominantly those 
who were dominantly Muslim, underlining that Soviet policy was often inconsistent for 
maintaining gender and homosexual rights and equality (Hazard, 1987). 
In relation to the NK conflict and peacebuilding though, gender and sexuality are rarely 
taken  into  account  in  the  research  of  the  conflict.  One  reason  is  that  gender  is  not 
considered as a social, political concern in this region due to the taken for grantedness of 
the gender binary and that fact that women have achieved property, voting, working rights 
in these countries. Queer and LGBT organizations such as Pink Armenia, Nefes LGBT 
which  are  well-known  in  the  region  are  concerned  with  the  living  conditions  of 
LGBT/queer individuals in the region. Even less is currently known about the situation of 
LGBT and queer community, a published article suggests that despite some advances in 
gender  equality,  LGBT and gender-queer  people continue  to  be seen as  ‘abnormal’  or 
‘sick’ who do not fit this culture and traditions (Jalilova, 2019). Representation of queer 
people  is  mostly  negatively  provocative  because  they  are  seen  as  physiologically  and 
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mentally sick in the S. Caucasian societies which I shall investigate in a deeper analysis of 
chapter  4.  “During  the  Henrich  Böll  Foundation  conference  of  2012  on  the  LGBTIQ 
situation in Azerbaijan, participants stated that while there is a certain degree of tolerance 
for  men  with  feminine  appearances  in  beauty  salons  and  show  business;  homosexual 
individuals are forced to live in a suffocating environment of discrimination and rejection, 
where  the  stereotypes  prevail”  (Jalilova,  2019).  This  suggests  that  if  a  man  behaves 
feminine, this is not acceptable in the daily routines of ordinary GBT and queer men and 
the society expects a man should behave masculine, brutal and tough. There is, however, 
little  condemnation  of  lesbians  in  these  societies  -an  issue  that  remains  silenced, 
disregarded and under-researched since lesbians are not perceived as a threat (van den 
Veur,  2007).  Queer  men  embody  alternative  types  of  masculinities  that  threatened 
Caucasian dominant masculinity (ibid). The main reason is not profoundly investigated in 
the  literature,  but  it  can  be  analysed  as  the  role  of  male-dominance  in  the  Caucasian 
societies.  For  centuries,  hegemonic  masculinities  had  a  dominant  role  in  the  politics, 
economics  and  importantly,  family  and  thus,  queer  men  deploy  a  different  image  of 
masculinity and men of the region. It suggests that hegemonic Caucasian masculinities do 
not aim to accept this alternative queer/GBT masculinities and change the power authority 
of  their  existing  embodied  masculinity.  The  absence  of  research  with  queer  people  in 
relation to NK conflict can be linked to the absence of queer people’s ‘coming out’ in their 
communities  and  wider  society.  Coming  out  as  gay  or  lesbian  or  transgender  bears 
essential risks including honour killings of family members (ibid). In the absence of self-
identification, queer people remain invisibilized within these societies.
Gender and war related violence and trauma 
Trauma is considered at the core of many problems after the displacement and war in the 
S.  Caucasus  region.  The  existing  literature  suggests  that  trauma  is  a  crucial  lens for 
understanding experiences of violent  displacement.  Trauma is a form of wounding that 
happens as a result of a violent and sad event, generating distress that exceeds one's ability 
to  cope  with  the  emotions  involved  with  that  experience  (Spiegel,  2006).  Men  are 
traumatised differently due to the fact that they were in the front lines of the war. However, 
this will not be a part of this thesis. In relation to IDP and refugee women, economic, 
social and sexual traumas are the most significant. Info about the war a bit here
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According to Najafizadeh (2013), there are three phases of forced displacement in which 
trauma has been noted. These are  (i)  the primary shock and trauma of war and of being 
forced to flee for one’s life; (ii) searching for a ‘safe pace’ from the war, facing the reality 
of an undefined future, and changing to their new identity as IDPs/refugees; and (iii)  the 
pains of displacement, emerging resilience, and giving up hope of going back home. In her 
research on Azerbaijani IDP and refugee women from NK, Najafizadeh elaborates on the 
social and economic trauma that women faced in the conflict.
Economic trauma includes the precarious living standards such as using shelters instead of 
their flats (which were occupied due to the war), carrying water in barrels on their back or 
even losing their children and husband while leaving their lands (Yalcın-Heckmann and 
Shahnazarian, 2010). Women who left these lands left their houses without even taking 
basic necessities. Many women did not have a proper flat or house until 2005. They used to 
live in wagons or sheds (Shahnazarian, 2014). The poor living conditions and poverty of 
these women become a material condition in their lives after the displacement.  In other 
words, the consequences of the NK conflict highly influence the economic conditions of 
women and thus, many working-class IDP and refugee women suffer the economic trauma 
as an ongoing situation after thirty years. 
Social trauma refers to the impossibilities of integrating into new societies and regions and 
villages (ibid). IDP and refugee women of NK are considered more conservative in terms 
of culture, values and tradition than local women from big cities such as Baku, Sumgayit, 
Yerevan and others. In this process, adopting the new values and lifestyles of women of 
the  new settlements  posed  large  barriers  for  many  IDP/refugee  women.  Even  if  they 
wanted  to  integrate  into  society,  they  often  are  not  accepted  by  the  local  women 
communities due to the cultural and ethnic prejudice (Najafizadeh, 2019).
Aside from social  and economic  traumas,  it  is  important  to  draw attention  to  possible 
sexual trauma such as rape and miscarriage in the NK conflict that are often silenced and 
invisibilized. According to Bernard and Durham (2014, p. 428), ‘sexual violence can be 
broadly defined as acts of a sexual nature imposed by force, a threat of force or coercion, 
or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or a person’s incapacity to give genuine 
consent’.  It  includes  rape,  sexual  slavery,  enforced  prostitution,  forced  pregnancy  and 
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enforced  sterilization  and  sexual  violence  perpetrated  for  strategic  purposes, 
opportunistically, or because it is tacitly tolerated. The extent of sexual violence in NK 
remains disputed. According to Selimovic (2012), rape of women most of the time occurs 
in connection with acts of war, even if local women’s organisations have claimed that the 
incidence was relatively low in the NK conflict. As it is often the case with sexual violence 
it tends to remain under-reported. at the same time, it remains important not to reduce all 
women as victims of trauma. 
1.4 Peacebuilding and the role of gender and ethnicity 
Before  I  return  to  current  peace  processes  and  the  general  background  of  the  peace 
strategy, I would like to elaborate on the term ‘frozen conflict’ and its relevance to the NK 
conflict. Tisdall (2010) defines frozen conflict as a condition where the ongoing conflict 
has  ended,  but  no  peace  agreement  or  political  frameworks  have  solved  the  conflict. 
Therefore, politically, the conflict can start again at any moment. This is the case in NK 
that has been considered as frozen conflicts, I shall analyse the progress of the current 
peace initiatives in relation to the instability of this frozen conflict. 
The situation of NGOs and civil society is not as good as in Armenia. According to the 
Democracy  Index  2019  report,  Azerbaijan  is  ranked  (146th)  among  the  authoritarian 
regimes. Meanwhile, Armenia is ranked (86th) among hybrid regimes. I aim to show how 
this influence the current peacebuilding and gender issues in the context of NK conflict. 
Romashov (2019) suggest that one reason for the exclusion of IDP and refugee women’s 
from peacebuilding in particular might be that complying with dominant patriarchal and 
militaristic norms mean that the feminine and anything that can ‘effeminize’ peacebuilding 
must be rejected from public and political realms).  As a result, war, violence, and weapons 
become  ‘both  a  significant  factor  in  masculine  identity  and  a  crucial  factor  in  the 
functioning  of  patriarchy’  (Reardon  1985,  p.18).  The  women  who  are  involved  in 
peacebuilding activities are mainly politicians, academics and public figures, and hence 
can be considered privileged women. And yet, other women are sometimes considered to 
be more interested in peace initiatives more than men (Najafizadeh, 2013). Kalatozishvili 
(2019) identifies only few NGOs in Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK that combine women and 
peace  initiatives.  As a  strategy to  overcome this  barrier,  women's  organizations  in  the 
region have applied international treaties around the Women, Peace and Security agenda 
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and united for the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on women's participation in peace 
processes  (ibid).  Swedish  sociologist  Mindauga  (2016)  also  has  examined  the  role  of 
women as mediators and their potential to challenge power and authority of the patriarchal 
structure in the NK. Mindauga describes the importance and the results of the women’s 
mediation  skills  in  peace  dialogues.  Importantly,  the  author  connects  the  negative 
outcomes of previous mediation and peacebuilding by hegemonic Caucasian masculinity 
with the absence of women as a failure of peace processes. 
At the same time, IDP and refugee women are among those who bear the brunt of the NK 
conflict.  Azerbaijani  sociologist  Mehrangiz  Najafizadeh  (2013)  observes  based  on  the 
statistical  and  demographic  surveys  that  Azerbaijani  IDP  women  constitute  71%  of 
Azerbaijanis  who  were  forcibly  displaced  when,  and  after  almost  twenty  years  of 
displacement still mostly live at the poverty line. She argues that it is important to hear the 
life stories, concerns and ideas from these IDP Azerbaijani women’s points of view. Even 
though the author considers Azerbaijani IDP women as the only oppressed group in her 
research, the author attempts to show the long-term impacts of the war and displacement 
on the everyday lives of IDP Azerbaijani women. Together with the presence of only well-
known and privileged women in the peacebuilding process, these under-representations 
and silences re-produce inequalities in the S. Caucasian society.  
 
Some  international  advocates  of  the  Women,  Peace  and  Security  agenda  argue  that 
women’s social roles, particularly their role as mothers, gives them a different advantage in 
overcoming both personal and political obstacles to peace (Porter, 2008, p.76). This idea is 
a very essentialist way of thinking about women in peace. To associate this issue only with 
women’s  motherhood  instincts  re-produces  the  traditional  gender  norms  in  the 
heteronormative  system.  Rather  what  is  needed  is  supporting  women’s  and  queer 
community's empowerment and participation as the source of insight and change. At the 
same time  Armenian  sociologist  Abrahamyan (2017) points  out  that  women in such a 
context  might  carry  the  double  burden  of  motherhood  and  victimization.  Women  are 
expected to give birth to male soldiers, who will be able to ‘protect’ them, while those 
same men serve the patriarchal system, which encourages domination over ‘others’. 
The existing literature suggests that IDP and refugee women are absent in the current peace 
discourses  of  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  and  thus,  there  is  no  enough  well-established 
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literature  about  these  women.  However,  there  are  several  international  organizations 
attempt to help these women for establishing some peace initiatives, but the main obstacle 
is  to  locate  them in the peace  processes.  Some authors  are  aware  of  the need for  the 
inclusion of IDP and refugee women, but they do not analyse the problem by looking at the 
ethnicity  and  gender.  Therefore,  these  women  still  remain  as  the  mother,  sister, 
grandmother figures in the NK conflict which re-produces the gender essentialism.
1.5   Towards an intersectional approach to life history analysis and 
peacebuilding 
Some authors argue peace is not only about the state of unarmed conflict, but is about the 
security, women’s rights, end of the violence against women, women’s control over their 
bodies and other relevant feminist issues (see, for example, Shahnazarian 2010; Selimovic 
et al., 2012). At the same time, it is apparent that a focus on gender or ethnicity alone is 
insufficient to take into account the differential effects of Armenian and Azerbaijani IDP 
women  and  refugees.  Here  an  intersectional  approach  seems  more  promising  and 
according to Crenshaw (1991), intersectionality is a lens through which we can analyse 
how axes of power and experience come together interlocks, or clash. Arguing from a legal 
perspective,  Crenshaw points out ‘It  is not simply that  there is  a race problem here,  a 
gender  problem here,  and a  class  or  LBGTQ problem there.  Many times,  that  [legal] 
framework erases what happens to people who are subject to all of these things’ (ibid). 
Crenshaw also mentions that intersectionality is a ‘transient concept connecting modern 
politics with postmodern theory’ that is significant until the interconnected categories gain 
multidimensionality  (1989).  Therefore,  each element  of inequality  interrelates  with and 
deploys  as a  context  for the other  way of inequalities,  and these inequalities  mutually 
construct  each  other.  Following  this,  according  to  McCall  intracategorical  approaches 
introduced  the  study  of  intersectionalities:  they  demonstrate  interwoven  relations  of 
categories  that  constitute  specific  locations  (2005:  1786).  Therefore,  researchers 
temporarily analyse existing categories such as gender, race, ethnicity and consider how 
they are distinctively shaped and have different  nuances in distinctively located groups 
(ibid).  Such  approach  allows  the  research  to  analyse  the  interwoven  relations  without 
reducing  one  category  to  another  one  and  thus,  intersectional  lenses  contribute  to 
uncovering the hidden elements of very sensitive issues. 
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In relation to peacebuilding, intersectionality recently has been used by Stefanie Kappler 
and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert in other conflict scenarios of Guatemalan women (2019). These 
authors argue that intersectionality of peace approach can help shed a new light on the 
power imbalances and inequalities within peacebuilding missions. The intersectionality of 
peace approach can highlight the power dynamics, where matters of intersectionality have 
continued to play a crucial role in the ways in which justice and peacebuilding discourses 
play out (Lederach, 2020). These authors demonstrate the role of gender, race and class in 
the peacebuilding and how the dominant framings of privileged ‘gender, race and class’ 
continues  to  play  a  major  role  in  peacebuilding.  They  attempt  to  uncover  the  role  of 
intersectional  peacebuilding  by analysing  the  interwoven relations  of  gender,  ethnicity, 
race,  age  and  power  relations.  In  this  process:  firstly,  they  understand  intersectional 
identities  without dichotomising them; secondly,  authors analyse these identities with a 
clear intention of grasping the power differentials; and thirdly, clutch life stories of women 
not  as  individualised  experiences,  but  instead  as  ways  of  accessing  larger  structural 
inequalities in the peacebuilding processes (Kappler and Lemay-Hébert, 2019).
Concerning Nagorno Karabakh, however, an intersectional approach in peacebuilding has 
not  yet  been taken  up (see,  for  instance,  Shahnazarian  2010,  2014;  Najafizadeh  2013, 
2019; Selimovic et al., 2012). These authors have published the main articles and books 
regarding the IDP and refugee women and their  life  stories  but  there is  no theoretical 
framework for  the intersectional  peacebuilding  in  the context  of  the NK conflict.  This 
begins  to  suggest  that,  to  be  successful,  peace  initiatives  in  NK  will  require  an 
intersectional approach that simultaneously takes into account the mutual constitution of 
differences  of  gender,  ethnicity,  sexuality,  socioeconomic  status  and  marginalized 
identities (such as working-class IDP / refugee women or queer). Such an intersectional 
approach  should  address  the  participation,  concerns  of  women  and  LGBT/queer 
community of various ages,  classes and ethnicities  in the region. However,  the current 
peace agenda of civil society in Armenia and Azerbaijan mainly focuses on the activism 
and work with the young generation or generally, re-engaging IDP and refugee Armenian 
and  Azerbaijani  people  without  considering  their  gender  differences,  ethnicity,  age, 
socioeconomic  conditions  and  needs.  For  instance,  one  of  the  EuroAsia  Partnership 
Foundation  funded  project  ‘Peacebuilding  through  Capacity  Enhancement  and  Civic 
Engagement (PeaCE)’ (2017-2020) is one of the examples of how the peace process is 
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organized by ignoring the multidimensionality of different identities, especially IDP and 
refugee  women  and  LGBT/queer  community  (Peacebuilding  through  Capacity 
Enhancement and Civic Engagement (PeaCE), 2017). The research conducted Selimovic 
and colleagues (2012) for the by Kvinna till Kvinna organization indicates that important 
reconciliation initiatives in [Armenia and Azerbaijan] led by women so far have not been 
taken seriously in national politics, where a low level of participation by women limits 
democracy and decreases the legitimacy of the power of formal political institutions.  An 
intersectional  approach can help developing the inter-ethnic intersectional  collaboration 
among the women of the region. Such peacebuilding projects might contribute to breaking 
down concepts/  stereotypes  of  the  enemy widely  propagated  by  national  mythmaking; 
promote  tolerance,  diversity,  and seek to  improve practical  skills  in  conflict  resolution 
among participants  (Caucasus Edition,  2014).  Most  importantly,  multidimensionality  of 
intersectionality in peacebuilding can bring more IDP and refugee women from Armenia 
and Azerbaijan to the peace initiatives which can contribute to the current dynamics of the 
peace processes.5 
An intersectional  approach  would  also  attend to  insights  and concerns  of  members  of 
LGBT/queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Firstly, intersectional perspective can 
allow understanding the position of LGBT/queer community in the peace processes of the 
NK  conflict  by  taking  their  ethnicity,  gender,  age  and  socioeconomic  conditions  into 
account. Secondly, an intersectional approach may foster the cooperation between queer 
community and other peacebuilders who also aim to be involved in the peacebuilding of 
NK conflict.  This  suggests  that  the  intersectional  perspective  may  also  establish  more 
multidimensionality within these processes. 
By taking an intersectional approach as a starting point, the research that follows this gap. 
The key argument for intersectional approach is that understanding peacebuilding either 
solely in inter-ethnic terms and in opposition of war and peace or conversely only as a 
woman’s issue can exacerbate inequalities and prevents a significant part of the post-war 
society from exercising their agency (Stavrevska, 2017). Such an intersectional approach is 
so far missing in the NK conflict.
 
5 I shall analyse the current peace processes and the role of IDP and refugee women for the peace initiatives 
in the chapter 5 where I suggest the changes to the current peacebuilding in the NK conflict.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I introduced the concepts of ethnicity, gender and sexuality, peacebuilding 
and intersectionality that I argue need to be addressed to understand the current conflict 
and potentials for peace processes in NK. This chapter gathered the dispersed literature on 
ethnicity,  nationality,  gender,  sexuality,  peacebuilding,  trauma  and  intersectionality  in 
relation to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh that so far has rarely been discussed from 
feminist perspectives.
The  literature  review  has  shown  that  the  ethnic  relations  between  Armenians  and 
Azerbaijanis historically shifted from friendship to enemy level because of the colonial 
policies of the former U.S.S.R which caused the frozen conflict (Nagorno-Karabakh) in 
order  to  control  these  territories  in  the  future.  In  this  process,  the  gender  regime  also 
remained very oppressive towards IDP and refugee women and non-normative sexualities. 
Gender and sexualities are often considered in a very heteronormative and discriminative 
way, where gender often refers to a distinction between a man and a woman in Caucasian 
societies. In Butler’s (1990) terms, gender refers to cultural effects of the heteronormative 
society and thus, it is considered as social construction. With the support of institutions 
such as family, patriarchy this system is strengthened for establishing the societies where 
hegemonic  masculinities  are  the  decision-makers  (Connell,  2005).  An  association  of 
motherhood as a virtue of womanhood also re-produces gender roles in the S. Caucasian 
society. In relation to peacebuilding I have shown that so far, IDP and refugee women and 
queer community have been largely excluded in the current peace initiatives (Selimovic et 
al., 2012). Women and LGBT/queer organizations are not numerous, and they fight against 
war and for women’s rights at the same time. As I have shown, this is connected with the 
hegemonic Caucasian masculinity, dominant gender roles, frozen conflict and the lack of 
women’s self-determination. Women’s freedom is limited in the peace agenda, as in many 
spheres of the S. Caucasus. There are no queer organisations active in peacebuilding which 
likely strengthen the patriarchal and heteronormative system within peace initiatives. 
In conclusion, there are a number of issues which so far have not been addressed. First, the 
S.  Caucasus  region is  a  very  specific  location  in  terms  of  cultural  differences,  gender 
inequalities, economic conditions and most importantly, political development and the NK 
conflict  that  is  under-researched  by  local  and  international  feminist  activists  and 
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researchers.  Second,  the  literature  sources  I  analysed  does  not  have  an  intersectional 
understanding of the subjects and process of peacebuilding like Najafizadeh’s (2013) work 
which  portrayed  Azerbaijani  IDP woman as  homogenous  group  without  including  the 
intersecting identities of these women. Third, the ethnicity is not analysed in relation to 
gender  regime  and  mostly,  it  is  seen  as  a  separate  entity  from gender.  However,  the 
analysis of the NK conflict suggests that these two elements should be analysed together 
by demonstrating the axes of inequalities. Fourth, visions of queer individuals are entirely 
absent in the discussion about the resolution of the NK conflict. In light of these absences, 
the  current  thesis  aims  to  develop  a  more  comprehensive  feminist  intersectional 
perspective for the current peace initiatives.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1 Research design and methods
The key aim of the research is to explore the effects of the conflict in NK on the lives and 
concerns of IDP and refugee women and LGBT/queers  from Armenia,  Azerbaijan and 
Nagorno-Karabakh and to think about how these actors can participate in peacebuilding. 
Thus, I am interested in people who define themselves as IDP and refugee women or the 
member of queer community and are affected by and concerned with the NK conflict even 
if they were not born in the territory.
In my research question I am particularly interested in how - Armenian and Azerbaijani 
IDP and refugee women and LGBT/queers might be differently affected and how these 
effects contribute to their exclusion from the current peace processes? How might more 
inclusionary peace processes in the context of NK conflict be enabled?
A  qualitative  research  design  is  best  suited  for  addressing  these  research  questions. 
Qualitative  research emphasizes  the  importance of contextual  knowledge, derived from 
participant-centred methods.  Rather  than  imposing  preconceived  categorizations  upon 
participants, which effectively turn them into objects of research, qualitative research seeks 
to create  space for dialogues that afford the researchers a greater understanding of how 
participants understand themselves within their social worlds.
As  the  method  of  data  collection,  I  chose  semi-structured  open-ended  interviews  and 
participant  observation  in  and  around  the  cities  of  Tbilisi,  (Georgia)  and  Baku  and 
Sumgayit,  (Azerbaijan).  These  cities  are  relevant  because  of  the  role  that  these  cities 
played  in  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  Many IDPs  and  refugees  live  in  these  field 
locations and thus, as a researcher,  I had a chance to meet more people from IDP and 
refugee  community  in  these  field  locations.  I  had  already  established  relation  to  such 
communities  during previous  visits  of IDP towns in  Azerbaijan  and people that  I  met 
during my previous field research.
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Figure 3: The fieldsites of this research [map]
Participant observation  aims to  provide data on the tacit aspects of the varied lives  and 
interpersonal  interactions.  Observation  complemented  individual  interviews  and  was 
carried out in participants’ homes. As I show below participant observation allowed giving 
further insights particularly into power hierarchies within communities.  My insider and 
outsider positions changed from time to time when I was conducting this research with IDP 
and refugee women and LGBT/queer participants. The point here is that the separation of 
insider/outsider is often not specifically clear cut and is undoubtedly not fixed amongst 
people  within  one  group.  For  instance,  when  I  visited  the  participants  in  the  village, 
Georgia they treated me very friendly and nicely and tried to make me feel like I am one of 
them and  at  this  point,  I  realized  the  refraction  of  my  outsider  identity.  However,  in 
Sumgayit, people treated me as an outsider. When I was passing through the street, there 
was a small bakery where four women were working under the supervision of a middle-
aged man with a huge moustache. For a while I observed them and that men suddenly 
started to yell at me by saying ‘if you do not want to buy something, what are you doing 
here?’ It seemed like people did not like ‘outsiders’ in this part of the town. 
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Following these, 15 interviews were conducted in a way that they were attentive to the 
mutual constructions or creative collaborations (Campbell and Lassiter, 2014). Interview 
allows to bring in experiences and concerns that cannot be directly observed. A topic guide 
for the semi-structured in-depth interviews included open-ended questions that encourage 
the  research  participants  to  direct  the  flow of  the  conversation  and develop their  own 
structures of relevance.
The open-ended interviews were conducted with the participants in Baku and Sumgayit in 
Azerbaijan, Tbilisi and a village near Tbilisi in Georgia, and via the internet. I contacted 
the participants with the support of my colleagues who also worked with IDP and refugee 
communities in the past. For the LGBT/queer  participants, I asked my queer friends to 
share the connections with LGBT/ queer people in Armenian and Azerbaijan. My sample 
consisted of altogether  22 people from different  15 interviews were tape recorded and 
complemented by field notes (see- 2.3:Table 1). I used two different samplings for the 
interviews and conducted semi-structured open-ended interviews with seven Armenians, 
seven Azerbaijanis, and one Lezgin; and 5 interviews with men and women who identified 
as lesbian, gay, transgender and queer. The topic guides focused on the issues of gender 
and gendered aspects of the NK conflict,  and intersectional  approach to peacebuilding, 
especially  with  the  IDP and  refugee  women,  and  on  issues  relied  on  sexuality  in  the 
Caucasus, the role of queerness in the context of militarization of NK conflict  and the 
queer perspectives on the resolution of the NK conflict, respectively. 
Tape-recorded interviews were transcribed for data for analysis. Analysis proceeded via 
open coding was the first step in the data analysis to identify emerging themes as well as 
reflections and omissions. Informed consent was sought by all participants and to ensure 
anonymity,  I  have created pseudonym for all  research participants,  which is  especially 
important in the context of the political conflict - the NK conflict. 
Except for these, I attempted to contact some women’s organizations which work at the 
intersections of gender and peace, but they were not interested in conducting interviews 
with  me.  Since  most  of  these  NGOs  did  not  have  well-established  websites,  thus,  in 
chapter 5, I analysed the websites of some of the main peacebuilding initiatives and NGOs 
from Armenia and Azerbaijan which were not women’s NGOs.
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2.2 Field sites and researcher positionality
Positionality in gender studies is a key point of reflection since  who we are and how we 
are perceived affects the way the persons whom we study react to us. While the ways in 
which my positionality took shape and impacted the research can only be examined in 
concrete research encounters, and need to be examined throughout the research. I would 
like to highlight some aspects of my positionality that shaped the contours of the research 
at the outsets. 
In  short,  I  am  a  Baku-born  twenty-three-year-old  queer  gender  studies  student  and 
researcher  who  has  lived  in  Azerbaijan  (and  holds  the  citizenship  of  the  Republic  of 
Azerbaijan) for more than twenty years. Since my childhood the NK conflict has been a 
sensitive  topic  in  Azerbaijani  society  and  people  hated  Armenians.  This  shaped  my 
childhood memories and traumatized me during all of these years. At the same time, my 
nationality  prevented  me  from  travelling  to  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  and  Armenia  to 
discover and understand the insights of people who live there. 
Given these restrictions and previous contacts, my fieldwork was conducted over ten days 
at four (five-including online research site) key sites in Azerbaijan, Georgia (and Armenia: 
online  research  site)  (see,  figure  3  above).  I  conducted  my  research  in  four  different 
languages.  My first research  location  site  was  Sumgayit,  in  Azerbaijan  and  here,  I 
interviewed 3 IDP women from Azerbaijan. Sumgayit is a seaside industrial city on the 
shores  of  Caspian  Sea.  It  has  never  been  remarkably  populous,  reaching  its  peak  of 
133.000 inhabitants just before the NK conflict (World Population Statistics, 1971). Even 
though Sumgayit was a new city built up in the 1950s, the city was highly populated with 
IDP women who settled there in the wake of the NK war and displacement in 1990s. The 
main  reason  for  this  settlement  could  be  the  good  location  and  the  employment 
opportunities in the city. The neighbourhoods where participants lived were poor; waste 
littered deserted streets and a smell of urine and also, I did not feel welcomed in Sumgayit. 
The second research  site  was  in  Baku  the  Azerbaijani  capital  where  I  conducted  the 
interviews with queers, peace activists and an Azerbaijani refugee from Armenia. Since 
independence  in  1991,  Baku  became  a  highly  industrialized  oil-rich  affluent  city  of 
Caucasus.  I  have mainly  interviewed the research participants  in small  cafes and local 
restaurants in the city centre where participants go occasionally.  I have also visited the 
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house of one refugee woman, who had a large garden where she rented three of the small  
houses in her area. I have known this woman, a neighbour of my grandmother, since my 
childhood. Around the neighbourhood, there were three gas stations, two big supermarkets, 
two-car shops and factories.  When I entered her house,  she was feeding a lot of hens, 
chickens,  turkeys and some cows. The house smelt  like  a  real  animal  farm and I  was 
surprised to feel like in the village in the midst of one of the industrialized parts of Baku. 
The third research  site6 was  a  village  near  Tbilisi-  Dartloch,  Georgia.  The  village  was 
approximately thirty-five km far from Tbilisi and here, some Azerbaijani, Armenian and 
Georgian people lived together. I chose this site to interview two Armenian refugees (from 
Baku) women who currently live in that village since I was unable to visit Armenia. The 
Georgian village was similar to the Sumgayit neighbourhood where I interviewed the IDP 
women. The streets were full of smelly garbage and cigarette ashes but unlike Sumgayit, in 
this  village  people  were  in  the  streets  and  everyone  was  friendly  and  talkative.  One 
Georgian woman asked me to visit her house and be a guest and wanted to talk to me about 
the Russian hegemony in these countries. I kindly declined since I needed to return to my 
accommodation  in  Tbilisi.  Research  participants lived  next  to  each  other  and  their 
houses/apartments places were poorer than the houses of my Azerbaijani participants. The 
ceilings had small holes in the roof and buckets were placed under these holes. They had a 
small refrigerator and broken radio. One of the women did not have electricity for more 
than eleven days. Their flat consisted of a single room for sleeping, eating and welcoming 
guests. Even though these women clearly had economic problems, they both offered me 
hot beverages with some sweets such as chocolate and cookies.
The fourth research was Tbilisi, in Georgia where I conducted an interview with one of the 
refugee  Armenian  refugee  participant.  Tbilisi  was  also  in  the  process  of  becoming  an 
industrialized European city, but the participant lived in panel houses from Soviet area. 
The apartment block had nine floors and was called ‘Leningardski proyekt’ alluding to the 
Soviet buildings in St. Petersburg. The neighbourhood was rather empty, and I came to the 
building by asking some people in the streets, but most of them refused to talk to me either 
in  Russian  or  in  English.  The  entry  of  the  building  did  smell  similarly  to  the 
neighbourhood in Sumgayit. There was strong smell of urine on each floor. The wooden 
6 Due to personal request of participant, I cannot mention name of village and the pseudonym is ‘Dartloch’.
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door was old and when I entered the walls were without plasters. In the guest room ere was 
only one table and three chairs and nothing else. I only had time to spent half-day in Tbilisi 
and therefore could not interview other Armenian refugee women in Tbilisi.
The final site was the virtual site of the internet. I was unable to conduct my research in the 
territories  of  Armenia  and  Nagorno-Karabakh  due  to  the  ethno-political  Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.  As a consequence,  I conducted my interviews with five participants 
who live in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh via the internet. Two of the participants lived 
in the Armenian capital of Yerevan, one of them was living in the Netherlands and one 
participant  was  from  the  Nagorno-Karabakh.  Except  for  the  Armenian  participants,  I 
interviewed one Azerbaijani participant who lives in Italy via the internet, as well. As part 
of  short-term research,  I  missed  the  chance  to  develop a  special  relationship  with  the 
research participants virtuality caused additional barriers including mistrust, fear and self-
defence. In one instance, a participant refused to meet via a social platform and preferred 
using a special application for having a voice call and then, the participant did not show up 
for the interview. 
Learning  about  the  difficult  life  stories  of  marginalized  IDP  and  refugee  women, 
LGBT/queer  from  Armenia,  Azerbaijan  and  Nagorno-Karabakh  both  in  content  and 
process was not an easy research. First, limitation of access: in my research, my gender, 
ethnicity, age, social status played a crucial role in terms of who I was able to interview. 
With respect to gender as I had expected, I received many rejections from IDP and refugee 
women due to the fact that I was considered a male researcher. Gender distinction may not 
be seen so obviously in the capital or bigger cities but became more apparent in smaller 
towns. For instance, one of the participants accepted my invitation but after seeing that I 
shall be in the room with her, she refused interview and asked me to wait for her husband. 
Second, my ethnicity also played a significant role in the interactions with the participants 
from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. I was considered an ‘Azerbaijani researcher’ rather 
than a researcher for some of these participants. There was an issue of trust, for instance, 
one old female refugee Armenian participant asked me to stop recording and told me that 
she is afraid of having troubles because of this recording. Then, she continued to mention 
very traumatic moments of her deportation from Baku. Hence, my ethnicity became a very 
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challenging  issue  in  the  research  process.  I  received  also  many  rejections  from  the 
participants from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, especially women. 
For the LGBT/queer participants from Armenia, the reason behind the rejection could be 
interpreted as the current unfavourable situation against queer individuals in Armenia and 
thus, those participants were afraid of visibilizing themselves in these interviews. This also 
shows that they did not put their faith in me (the peer, researcher, queer fellow) because 
they did not believe the anonymity of the interviews. Additionally, these participants could 
be afraid of participating in this research because of my constructed ‘Azerbaijani’ ethnicity 
which is  a part  of ‘enemy’ propaganda of the Armenian government.  The rejection of 
potential  Azerbaijani  participants  was also connected with the homophobic Azerbaijani 
society  and the  issue  of  trust.  They were  also  afraid  of  visibilizing  themselves  in  the 
homophobic Azerbaijani society because of losing their jobs, friends and families. This 
also suggests that they did not trust me because of the same anonymity reasons.
Third, I was concerned with insecurities of meaning of my research participants which 
made the data analysis more situated. According to Gunaratnam (2003) the insecurities of 
meaning are constituted by the subjective and social differences between researcher and 
participants.  This  research  was  a  cross-cultural  practice  which  included  people  from 
different cultural backgrounds such as Armenian, Azerbaijani and Karabakian. For many 
Azerbaijani participants, the Nagorno-Karabakh region was a part of Azerbaijan, but in my 
research, I analysed the region as a separate entity from Azerbaijan. When I was talking to 
the participant in Sumgayit, she highlighted this sentence many times ‘when we go back to 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan’. At this point, the participant’s insight entangled me to 
understand what she wanted to mean by saying such phrase. Because, in my point of view, 
Nagorno-Karabakh  was  a  part  of  Nagorno-Karabakh  not  Armenia  or  Azerbaijan. 
Therefore, such insecurities of meanings shaped the empirical analysis of my research in 
different  directions  and I  came up with  more  sophisticated  analysis  of  data.  This  also 
suggested  that  the  research  findings  are  always  a  co-production  of  researcher  and the 
research participants (ibid).
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2.3 Table I: Compiled Participant Information
Pseudonym Gender Age Ethnicity Socioeconomic 
status
Fieldsite Citizenship
Tamara Woman 60-70 Armenian  working-class Dartloch Georgia
Anoush Woman 60-70 Armenian  working-class Dartloch Georgia
Alla Woman 50-60 Armenian  working-class Tbilisi Georgia
Aydan Woman 30-40 Azerbaijani  middle-class Baku Azerbaijan
Elnaz Woman 50-60 Azerbaijani  working-class Sumgayit Azerbaijan
Shalala Woman 50-60 Azerbaijani  working-class Baku Azerbaijan
Ulnaz Woman 60-70 Azerbaijani  working-class Sumgayit Azerbaijan
Zubeyda Woman 60-70 Azerbaijani  middle/upper-
class
Sumgayit Azerbaijan
Firuza Woman 20-30 Azerbaijani  middle-class Online Azerbaijan
Kohar Woman 20-30 Armenian  middle-class Online Nagorno-
Karabakh
Lilit Transgender 30-40 Armenian  middle-class Online Armenia
Eldar Queer 20-30 Azerbaijani  working-class Baku Azerbaijan
Hayk Queer 20-30 Armenian  working-class Online Armenia
Vardan Gay 20-30 Armenian  middle-class Online Armenia
Leyla Lesbian 30-40 Lezgin  middle-class Baku Azerbaijan
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Chapter 3: The Effects of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict in the Lives of IDP and Refugee Women
3.1 Introduction
The  long-term  effects  of  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict  still  remain  under-researched 
areas when it comes to the lives of IDP and refugee women. In this chapter, I seek to 
examine  in what  ways  are  the lives of Armenian,  Azerbaijani  and Karabakh  displaced 
women differentially impacted by the ongoing conflict? How are their socioeconomic and 
health conditions  intersectionally constituted by gender and ethnicity? Najafizadeh (2013) 
argued most of Azerbaijani IDP women live in the poverty line and they are the most 
vulnerable group and by doing so,  the researcher created a homogenous image of IDP 
women without taking ethnic differences into account. Concerning cultural discrimination, 
Shahnazarian (2010) focused on the discrimination against refugee Armenian women from 
cultural  and economic  perspectives  but  the researcher  also  did not  analyse the  role  of 
ethnicity. Kvinna till Kvinna (2019) investigated the role of militarization in the lives of 
IDP and refugee women without distinguishing impact of family status on the concerns of 
married, widow and single women. 
In this chapter, I explore the accounts of  ethnic privilege of Azerbaijani displaced women 
concerning their  economic  conditions,  the  discrimination  of  Armenian  and Azerbaijani 
refugee  women  face  regarding  the  social  support,  the  notion  of  ethnicity  and  the 
perceptions of different categories of women concerning the militarization. By doing so, I 
show how studies  of  gender  in  Armenia  and Azerbaijan  can incorporate  intersectional 
approaches to gain insights into a wider range of societal problems of the NK conflict that 
at first sight seem removed from questions of gender, ethnicity, age and class. The chapter 
contributes to examining the challenges that IDP and refugee women face that  will be 
important to take into account for peacebuilding efforts in the NK conflict (see, chapter 5). 
In the analysis  ,   precarious living conditions,  discrimination,  social  support,  ill-health, 
militarisation  and  the  silences  about  the  sexual  violence  are  lenses  through  which  to 
explore the situational making and unmaking and interactions of gender, ethnicity, class 
from  an  intersectional  perspective.  I  focus  on  what  kinds  of  challenges,  effects  and 
valuations are constituted in the narratives of women, and what they afford.
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3.2 Precarious living conditions 
For the analysis of the women’s material living conditions  I draw on the stories of ten 
women  participants:  six  Azerbaijani  IDP  women  living  Sumgayit  (Elnaz,  Ulnaz  and 
Zubeyda) and in Baku (Aydan, Shalala and Firuza-online); three Armenian refugee women 
living in the village of Dartloch (Anoush and Tamara) and in Tbilisi (Alla); and Kohar who 
lives in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
The Azerbaijani city of Sumgayit (around 300.000 inhabitants), is a Soviet-era hub for the 
petrochemical industry. Shops and restaurants sell alcohol, and residents dress casually. 
Sumgayit became home to more than 46.000 Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs, mainly from 
Qubadli  and Zangilan  regions after  the NK conflict  (Internal  Displacement  Monitoring 
Centre,  2007). The participants claimed that actual numbers were higher because many 
people are still registered in the territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding 
territories.  Azerbaijani  research participants  emphasised many IDP and refugee women 
live  in  poverty.  Data  from the  Asian  Development  Bank  (2015)  indicates  that  4.9  % 
Azerbaijani people (in Azerbaijan) live below the poverty line, and this rate was 29.8 % for 
Armenians in Armenia. The working-class IDP and refugee women are considered one of 
the most vulnerable groups in these indicators. In my research, most the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani research participants lived in relative poverty, where households receive 50% 
less than average household income, so they have some financial income, but this barely 
covers basic necessities (Foster, 1998). However, the situation of Azerbaijani women was 
socioeconomically better than the Armenian women who lived in Dartloch. 
In  the  Sumgayit  neighbourhood  where  Zubeyda,  a  65-year-old  Azerbaijani  displaced 
widow from Kalbajar7 had her house, the street was so dirty. However, when I entered 
Zubeyda’s house, I found her house well furnished; besides, the house had a well-tended 
garden where she cultivated rose, peach and apple. Zubeyda was a middle-class woman in 
Sumgayit  and  had  better  living  conditions  than  most  of  the  IDP  participants.  She 
mentioned that ‘when I left Kalbajar, I managed to take my pieces of jewellery. I sold them 
to buy a house and small bakery’. This can suggest Zubeyda had a financial capacity for 
maintaining her living conditions which problematises the perception that all   IDP and 
refugee women are destitute.  The contrast of Zubeyda’s well maintained house and the 
7 Kalbajar is an affluent rural region in Karabakh which is de facto controlled by the Republic of Artsakh.
35
neighbourhood  shows  that  Zubeyda  has  financial  capacity  to  take  care  of  this 
neighbourhood  and  make  it  a  more  liveable  place  like  her  garden,  but  she  was  not 
interested in this.  
In  the  village  of  Dartloch,  I  interviewed  Tamara,  a  68-year-old  single  working-class 
Armenian refugee woman who was deported from Baku in 1989. Tamara moved from the 
cosmopolitan Azerbaijani capital8 to the second largest Armenian conservative city Gyumri 
in 1989 and in 1997, she moved to Dartloch in Georgia. The neighbourhood where Tamara 
lived was as dirty as Zubeyda’s. The streets were full of waste, and apple. Tamara was 
living in a very old and humid shack which was made of sand and concrete. 
‘I  am  poor  because  I  do  not  have  good  living  standards,  and  it  is  due  to  war  and 
displacement. I could not even manage to sell my house before the deportation. If we did 
not  have  war,  I  could  be  middle-class.’  Tamara,  68,  single,  Armenian,  working  class 
refugee, Dartloch 
This account challenges the view of Azerbaijani officials who had claimed that Armenians 
in Azerbaijan were able to sell their houses before they were deported to Armenia and had 
therefore  much  better  living  conditions  in  Armenia  (Musaelyan,  2019).  In  contrast 
Azerbaijani  side claims that  Azerbaijanis  dispelled from NK were not allowed to take 
anything and left ‘barefoot’ (Najafizadeh, 2013). Both Zubeyda’s and Tamara’s narratives 
cast  doubts on these accounts.  Tamara could not sell  her house in 1989 and had been 
unable  to  change  her  living  conditions  since  1989.  This  was  partly  due  to  a  lack  of 
employment and social support. Therefore, Tamara moved from Armenia to Georgia to 
find better job opportunities and maybe, in the future possibility of getting pensions from 
the  Azerbaijani  or  Georgian  government.  But  Tamara’s  marital  status,  ethnicity,  and 
refugee identity too played a role in her poverty. Whereas Zubeyda, for example as an 
Azerbaijani  IDP  and  widow  was  entitled  to  social  support  from  the  Azerbaijani 
government.  No  such  support  was  provided  by  either  the  Armenian  or  Azerbaijani 
governments for Tamara. In contrast to a unified image of poverty effected by the NK 
conflict,  IDP  and  refugee  women  experience  the  consequences  of  the  NK  war  very 
8 As I previously mentioned, not all the Armenian refugees were from Baku. There were many refugees who 
were coming from rural areas of Azerbaijan to Yerevan. However, Armenian participants were refugees from 
Baku.
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differently depending on their class, marital status, the situational conditions of flight and 
expulsion and the welfare benefits available in their places of resettlement. 
3.2.1 Cultural discrimination against IDP and refugee women
The  analysis  further  suggests  that  cultural  discrimination  contributes  to  the  precarious 
living  conditions  of  IDP and refugee  women.  Gender  and peace studies  scholars  from 
Armenia and Azerbaijan have argued the discrimination against IDP and refugee women is 
grounded  in  cultural  differences  (Shahnazarian,  2014,  Najafizadeh  (2013).  Najafizadeh 
(2013),  for  example,  suggests  that  Azerbaijani  IDP  women  from NK  were  culturally 
different from the urban women in terms of their lifestyles, dress habits, and accents. These 
cultural distinctions led the isolation of IDP and refugee women in their settlements.
Here I want to examine if and how the IDP and refugee women interviewed experienced 
cultural discrimination and how these impacted their living conditions of these women. I 
begin by turning to the narrative of Aydan, a displaced Azerbaijani woman who currently 
lives in Switzerland.
‘In  Azerbaijan,  people  never  use  the  word  IDP;  they  always  call  others  “qaçqın” 
(refugee).  They use this  term [qaçqın] when they want to insult  someone… some IDPs 
refuse their IDP identities. It is something to do with  self-dense and connected with the 
ego. These people know that there is no positive understanding of this identity... In order to 
be fully accepted, they firstly refuse this identity and secondly start to humiliate the notion 
of  IDP.  I  understand  them,  and  unfortunately,  IDPs  cannot  be  fully  integrated  into 
urbanized Azerbaijani  society...  For instance,  I  do not understand the practice of  IDP 
camps or IDP towns! It is not inclusive, and by doing this, you isolate the IDP community. 
These  places  are  located  in  very  remote  places.  How can  these  people  integrate  into 
Azerbaijani urbanized culture? That is the reason behind this shame’ Aydan, 32, middle-
class, Azerbaijani IDP, Switzerland.
 It is possible to offer a cultural interpretation of Aydan’s resistance to the segregation of 
IDPs in IDP camps through explicit  reference to her biography. Aydan is 32 years old 
married  middle-class  Azerbaijani  IDP  woman  who  had  lived  in  Baku,  experienced 
displacement  from  NK  when  she  was  six-years-old.  Her  childhood  was  shaped  by 
experiences of displacement and isolation. At several points during the interview, Aydan’s 
facial  expression changed when I asked What is problematic  about IDPs in big cities? 
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Childhood  memories  were  triggered  reminding  her  that  she  had  been  part  of   IDP 
community which was not ‘culturally integrated’ into the urban Azerbaijani culture. 
Aydan’s  account  suggests  that  Najafizadeh  (2013)  argument  concerning  the  ‘cultural 
integration’ is limited because the author did not analyse the concentrated settlements or 
camps as an obstacle to the integration process. Aydan suggests that cultural discrimination 
against  IDP  women  is  connected  with  segregated  housing,  such  that  IDPs  are 
accommodated  in  the  isolated  parts  of  the  bigger  cities.  Historically,  the  Azerbaijani 
government  provided special  flats  for  the IDPs in  suburbs  or  smaller  towns that  were 
around 70-90 minutes away by public transport from the centre of bigger cities (Selimovic 
et al., 2012). Most IDPs are not financially capable of buying such an expensive flat in the 
centre. This can be seen as one of the failures of the Azerbaijani government in support of 
IDPs. Cornering IDPs off into the remote and isolated parts of Azerbaijan cities cannot 
build  bridges  between  IDPs  and  locals.  Thus,  the  integration  is  hindered  by  spatial 
segregation that both assumes and reinforces cultural difference. 
Aydan’s account also suggests that some IDP women do not want to self-identify as IDP 
which she links to prejudice, a possible consequence of the precarious living conditions of 
IDP women. Indeed, it appeared that many IDP women had an ambivalent relation about 
the IDP identity. The interviews accentuate two reasons for the refusal to identify as IDP: 
first,  IDP  women  were  considered  less  ‘civilized  and  uneducated’  –  even  barbaric 
(Najafizadeh,  2019) – and thus,  IDP became an insult  in  Azerbaijani  society.  Second, 
Aydan  maintained  that  the  financial  support  from  the  Azerbaijani  government  that 
Azerbaijani IDPs received, created the myth that ‘IDPs do not work’ – one of the oldest 
stereotypes  in  othering.  Locals  in  big cities  associated  IDPs with laziness  and welfare 
dependency.  Najafizadeh  (2019)  argued  many  IDP  women  cannot  find  a  paid  work 
because  of  this  discrimination  (association  with  laziness)  –  a  vicious  circle,  which  is 
unscored.  Why  many  IDPs  refused  to  self-identify  as  IDP  is  contributing  to  their 
invisibility. 
This was most evident in the refusal of seven Azerbaijani women with a background of 
displacement to participate in the research, since they did not consider themselves as IDPs. 
They claimed their identity as locals since they were able to integrate into urban life. It is  
worth noting that these women already owned houses in bigger cities (Baku, Sumgayit and 
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others) during the 1970s and did not want to associate themselves with the poverty of IDP 
women. 
These  accounts  further  problematise  the  assumption  that  all  IDPs  are  poor  and 
marginalised.  Moreover,  they reveal that such stereotypes are in part a consequence of 
sampling strategies that rely as Najafizadeh (2013) and Selimovic (2012) do on the self-
identification of IDP women. In contrast it is the non-participants that demonstrate that 
Azerbaijani IDP women can and do integrate into the urban cultures. At the same time, 
through the  non-participation  of  these women suggests  that  integration  is  premised on 
assimilation and their IDP status has to be renounced for becoming a part of the urban 
Azerbaijani  cultures.  In  other  words,  urban  Azerbaijani  culture  both  vilifies  and 
encourages IDP women to give up on their cultural identities. 
To further complicate these dynamics, I turn to Firuza, a displaced Azerbaijani woman 
who now lives in Baku/Italy.
‘All our traumas are connected with our living conditions, our integration into Azerbaijani 
society. My family and I moved to Russia when I was a child … For a long time, I never 
mentioned my origins in Azerbaijan. If I would say that I am Karabakh-Azerbaijani people 
would humiliate me. Because when I was doing my BA degree [in Baku], I did not pay any 
tuition  fee  because  I  was  IDP  and  we  were  exempt  from  paying  fees.  However,  my 
classmates paid the tuition fees...  These classmates always complained about the IDPs 
from Nagorno Karabakh who live in Baku and get these privileges…. Most of the time, 
these people blamed us for leaving the territories of NK and moving to Baku. They called 
us ‘traitors’...  I always question why being an IDP is so problematic in this country?’ 
Firuza, 27, single, middle-class, Azerbaijani IDP, Baku/Italy
The  phrase  ‘people  would  humiliate  me’  suggests  that  humiliation  was  a  threat  that 
motivated Firuza to hide her IDP background. Firuza’s account also suggests that ethnic 
difference is situationally performed. While living in Russia, she has never questioned her 
‘IDP identity’ which implies that Firuza realized the denigration of IDPs only after moving 
to Baku where it led to ‘bullying’ . Indeed, financial support did both contribute to her 
living conditions and it caused problems of integration. This complicates the image of IDP 
as poor and uncivilised in place of the claim of their undeserved privilege.  
Another aspect of distinction and denigration that surfaced in my interviews was the claim 
that IDPs did not defend their land. They were ‘traitors’ because they did not resist the 
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Armenians who displaced them – a claim that was mixed with the undeserving privileges I 
discussed above. A significant axis of differentiating ‘locals’  and ‘IDPs’ then is not so 
much ethnic or cultural  difference than perceived inequalities of welfare.  That fostered 
(and fosters) the hate and social exclusion of locals against IDP and refugee women while 
at  the time problematising  the monolithic  framing (established by the governments)  of 
precarity and poverty of these women.
The hate against IDP women was present in Sumgayit, as well. Consider Elnaz’s account:
 ‘People, in bigger cities hate IDPs and refugees. Once, I was on the bus, and someone’s 
child was crying. While I was boarding the bus, a lady pointed at me and told her kid that 
if she did not stop, she would give the child to me, an IDP woman. I felt so embarrassed 
and raised my voice. I said that IDPs are not cannibals... They even say that we did not 
fight for our land and we ran from our lands. Of course, they had no idea what we did 
there before we ran... I have tried to explain the situation .... But they are not willing to 
listen.’ Elnaz, 50, married, Azerbaijani working-class IDP, Sumgayit
Elnaz  is  a  fifty-years-old  married  working  class  displaced  Azerbaijani  woman  from 
Qubadli9 and lives in Sumgayit.  Like Zubeyda she had a small  garden where she was 
growing onion, cucumber, and other vegetables. Elnaz told me that she is a woman who 
grew up in nature and was having this small agricultural plot not to miss Qubadli. Her 
house was newly renovated, but she did not have a registration license and thus, she lived 
in an illegal house.  Elnaz was very kind and invited me for lunch, and I accepted her  
invitation. I start Elnaz’s account with her hospitality to underline how welcoming she was 
towards a male researcher whom she did not know. When Elnaz mentioned the hostile 
attitudes of local Sumgayit people against IDP women, it touched me profoundly. How 
could such a hospitable  welcoming woman be treated as a threat  and a monster.  Even 
though Elnaz was employed, she was excluded because of her perceived ethnic and rural 
IDP identity. In my participant observation, when I was returning back from the interviews 
to the central bus station for returning to Baku, in the city bus of Sumgayit, people were 
looking at each other very coldly and I started to panic a little bit. When I was getting off,  
the driver started to shout at me by saying ‘hey, IDP (qaçqın)? Get off by using the front 
door!’. In Baku, we used to get on by using the front door and get off at the middle or back  
door. The behaviour of people of this city made me think about the lives of IDP women 
participants.
9 Qubadlı has been de facto controlled by the forces of the Republic of Artsakh . 
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Taken together these narratives suggests that there is a strong exclusion of IDP women, 
and this exclusion does have variable connections with economic destitution and privilege. 
Elnaz’s isolation is not predicated on her economic status but mainly on her ethnocultural 
heritage and IDP woman identity. Here Najafizadeh (2013) and Kvinna till Kvinna (2019) 
also  missed  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  how  the  cultural  discrimination  is  also 
embedded in the cultural heritage (Karabakh) of IDP women like Elnaz. Elnaz claimed this 
identity is seen as something inferior and not compatible with the identities of the urban 
local women of Sumgayit. 
In  regard  to  cultural  integration  of  Armenian  refugee  women,  I  want  to  return  to  the 
accounts of Tamara and Anoush. As indicated above both women live in Dartloch. One of 
the problematic issues for Tamara (Armenian refugee from Baku) was to ‘integrate with 
people’, especially in the less developed area of Gyumri. Tamara recounts that when most 
of  the Armenian  women were forced to  leave  Azerbaijan  in  1989 because  of  the NK 
conflict and came to Armenia. Living in the capital Yerevan was too expensive for many 
refugee women since they did not have enough financial capacity for living in Yerevan.
 
‘Our Azerbaijanis[in Baku] took care of us, until the last day... We came to Gyumri... It 
was the last  flight  in  December 1989. We did not  want  to  leave,   we had a beautiful 
apartment,  wonderful  work,  and friends...  Honestly,  I miss them. No one discriminated 
according to what nationality you belong to. I miss my city. I'm not a nationalist, and I'm 
telling the truth...Living in Gyumri, Armenia was more challenging… I did not manage to 
integrate with people there… I was coming from Baku, the most  urbanized city  in the 
region and then, these things happened, and I was in Gyumri… People made me feel like I 
am not one of them because I was single, childless and still beautiful… Some women even 
called  me the ‘slut  of  Gyumri’  but  I  have never  done anything… It  was all  about  the 
cultural differences between them and me.’ Tamara, 68
Tamara’s  talk  about  Baku  and  ‘our  Azerbaijanis’  once  again  shows  how  ethnic 
identifications  are  performed  differently.  Tamara  did  not  speak  about  Armenian 
Azerbaijanis or Karabakh Azerbaijanis, only Bakuvian Azerbaijanis or ‘her’ Azerbaijanis. 
This can be a sign of her integration into the urbanized Azerbaijani,  Bakuvian culture. 
Tamara  was  not  ethnically  Azerbaijani  or  Muslim,  but  she  felt  fully  integrated  into 
urbanized  Bakuvian  culture.  This  suggests  how  ethnicity  is  inflected  by  urban-  rural 
distinctions  in her narrative.  In Gyumri, Tamara could not integrate into the culture of 
‘Armenians  of Gyumri’  that  was not as urbanized as Yerevan Armenians  or Bakuvian 
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Azerbaijanis. One of the possible interpretations is that Tamara was not accepted in the 
Christian  conservative  town because  of  dominant  gender  norms  whereby  a  woman  of 
Tamara’s age should have been married and have kids. This narrative of Tamara shares the 
similarity with Elnaz’s narrative: both women were discriminated against because of their 
different ethnocultural  heritage and values,  differently cast  as high or low culture.  The 
interesting contradiction is that Elnaz was not able to integrate into the urbanized culture 
because she refused to give up on her Karabakh identity cast as barbaric or low culture and 
Tamara refused to give up her urban identification, and thus, did not integrate into culture 
of Gyumri. The irony is that Elnaz was refused in Azerbaijani urban culture for being ‘too 
rural’ and Tamara was refused in Armenian culture for being ‘too urban’. This suggests 
that there is no monolithic framing of Azerbaijani or Armenian ethnicities, and distinctions 
are variable and enacted situationally in relation to other categories such as rural-urban 
distinction and gender. 
Anoush,  another  Armenian  refugee  had  moved  to  Yerevan  from  Baku,  and  faced 
discrimination as a refugee. Even though she left Azerbaijan thirty years ago,  she was still 
able to speak Azerbaijani. She was a 42-year-old housewife when she was forced to leave 
Azerbaijan in 1989. She lost her husband in the war, and she took care of her two sons. 
‘When I had already moved to Yerevan the dark times started… I worked at restaurants, 
and I had an accent in Armenian. When people heard this accent, they called me ‘filthy 
refugee from Azerbaijan.’... Even I received a passport called a ‘refugee passport’-neither 
Armenian nor Azerbaijani,  just a refugee… One day,  on the bus I heard someone was 
talking about refugees from Azerbaijan, and that man labelled us ‘incompetent and coward 
Azerbaijanis’. Anoush, 72, widow, working-class Armenian refugee, village 
Anoush’s story suggests that Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan were not welcomed even 
in Yerevan. Just as IDP was a label used to denigrate Azerbaijani displaced women, the 
term ‘refugee’ was used as a slur in the Armenian society against Armenian refugees from 
Azerbaijan. Anoush’s story also suggests that in Armenia the hate towards refugee women 
was both cultural  and economic.  She had faced discrimination while  looking for a job 
because of her Azerbaijani accent.  This shows how accent was enacted as a marker of 
distinction between Yerevan Armenians and Armenian refugees. Anoush mentioned that 
locals  thought  of  refugees  from  Azerbaijan  as  troublemakers  who  cause  traffic  jams, 
transportation and housing problems, a competitive labour market and more. 
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Armenian  and  Azerbaijani  IDP  and  refugee  women’s  experiences  of  ‘cultural’  and 
economic discrimination demonstrate the social consequences of the NK conflict. I have 
shown the multiplicity and interchangeability of framings that are never uncontested. There 
is always a problematic distinction of either being ‘Azerbaijani or Armenian’, ‘too urban or 
rural’, too lazy to work or stealing local job. Therefore, these women’s experiences are 
interconnected with the conditions and challenges which they have faced.
3.2.2 The role of ethnic privilege and social support
To mitigate poverty of IDP and refugee women, Azerbaijani and Armenian governments 
provide special social support for these women and their families (Shahnazarian, 2014). 
According to research by Kvinna till Kvinna (2019), in Azerbaijan, IDP and refugee status 
are both formally recognised by the state, and there are legal provisions for benefits such as 
access to temporary housing, subsidised utilities, monthly allowances, tax privileges and 
free higher education. The Armenian government also attempted to provide such support 
for Armenian refugees but financially, Armenia was not able to provide such support for 
all the refugees. For instance, in 1990, the GDP of Armenia was estimated around 2.26 
billion USD (World Bank Group, 2019), meanwhile this amount was 8.86 billion USD for 
Azerbaijan (ibid). Even in 2019, the Azerbaijani GDP was 47.171 billion USD and the 
Armenia GDP was only 13.444 billion USD (ibid). My research indicates, however, that 
Azerbaijani IDP women were able to access social support (provided by the government) 
much  easier  Azerbaijani  refugees  (from  Armenia)  and  Armenian  women.  Research 
participants  maintained  that  refugee women from Armenia  and Azerbaijan  faced more 
challenges and discrimination when applying for social support. That is, while IDP women 
are generally associated with being poor, sick and living in poverty (Najafizadeh, 2013), 
non-IDP research participants  argued that  IDP women had better  living standards than 
refugee women.  Zubeyda,  for example,  a self-employed single mother  was able  to get 
support from the Azerbaijani government:
‘I have planned everything from the beginning. I’ve tried to educate my children… 
look at their graduation pictures from the university! … I have four children; two 
are graduate students from the university, but the others are not… I have done all 
of this with the support of government subsidies, bank loans and my pension. If I 
had a chance, I would love to be young and move to Baku… I could buy many 
apartments  and educate  all  of  my children… I  am still  thankful  and happy… I 
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managed to  re-establish  many things.’  Zubeyda,  65,  widowed Azerbaijani  IDP, 
middle-class, Sumgayit
In contrast to Zubeyda’s imagination of Baku, Armenian refugee Shalala, who had fled 
from Spitak10, was forced to move to Baku in the 1980s 
‘Me, my husband and son, we all are working for more than twenty-five years to 
survive… We do not  receive  any benefits  from the government,  but  those IDPs 
receive free education, no communal fees and they even occupy the houses of other 
people … They told us,  ‘you are from Spitak’,  and even though we are legally 
entitled to get support, we still do not receive it from the Azerbaijani government... 
I am a middle-aged woman, and nobody wants to give me  a full-time job due to my 
age. So, I cook some sweets and sell them in the bazaar…’ Shalala, 56, married, 
working-class Azerbaijani refugee, Baku.
The possible  interpretation  of  these  narratives  is  the  existing  inequality  in  the  welfare 
distribution so that Azerbaijani IDP women receive some benefits from the Azerbaijani 
government, and refugees do not. This could show the double standards and intersectional 
discrimination against refugee women who first, do not come from Azerbaijani territories 
(Spitak is an Armenian city) and second cannot find regular work because of gender and 
age-based discrimination. Consequently, Shalala is forced to work in the grey economy, 
that is without work contract and social security, pension and health benefits).  There were 
more than ten people (including her son and his wife, their three grandchildren and her 
sisters and mother) in Shala’s family, relying on her labour selling animals and vegetables.  
However,  Shalala  does not  face discrimination  because of  being women or  refugee or 
middle-aged; she faces all of these discriminations because she is a middle-aged refugee 
woman  who  comes  from  the  working-class  Armenian  society.  Shahnazarian  (2013), 
Kvinna till Kvinna (2019) and Selimovic (2012) did not assertively analyse the interaction 
of  different  axes  of  inequalities  in  the  cases  of  refugee  women.  What  my  analysis 
contributes to is that the lack of access to social support worsened the economic situation 
of Shalala and deepened her relative poverty in comparison with many IDP Azerbaijani 
women.  Meanwhile,  Shalala’s  age,  housewife  and  marital  status  also  complicated  this 
picture by adding the interaction of different inequalities. 
10 Spitak is a town in the northern Armenia.
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As Shalala mentioned, most of the IDP families receive special benefits without challenges 
from  the  Azerbaijani  government.  After  losing  her  husband,  Zubeyda  had  also  faced 
economic difficulties, but she reshaped the stereotypical image of widow IDP women in 
the  Azerbaijani  society  with  the support  of  the  subsidies  from government.  Zubeyda’s 
widow status allowed her to take all  the decisions without consulting her husband, but 
Shalala’s case was not the same. Shalala was a married woman and it played a role in her 
precarious living condition, as well. One of the interpretations can be that her family status 
did not allow her to become more flexible and decision-maker like Zubeyda because her 
husband was the decision-maker in the family. Being denied state support, Shalala did not 
have any of these financial privileges and this showed how ethnicity in a broader sense 
played a significant  role  in  the cases of Shalala  and Zubeyda.  As a displaced woman, 
Zubeyda received financial support and continues to receive. It reproduces and strengthens 
the inequalities between middle/upper class IDP women and others (working-class IDP, 
refugee).  These stories suggest that IDP and refugee Azerbaijani women experienced the 
financial  support  of  the  government  differently  due  to  the  established  national 
differentiation.  This  ethnic  privilege  distributed  social  support  unequally  and  this 
inequality  deepened  the  poverty  among  refugee  women.  However,  in  the  upcoming 
sections, I aim to demonstrate that some working-class IDP women also could not manage 
to survive with the social support provided by the Azerbaijani government because those 
women suffered ill-health problems. Therefore, it is impossible to create a homogenous 
picture of IDP women in this issue. 
Including Armenian refugee women into the investigation of displacement creates a richer 
account  than  including  only  Azerbaijani  IDP  women.  My  research  participants  from 
Armenia claimed that most of the Armenian women also did not receive such subsidies 
from the Armenian government,  possibly because the Armenian government had fewer 
tax-based  resources  available  than  the  Azerbaijani  government  to  provide  these  living 
standards for Armenian refugee women. Recall that Tamara moved to Gyumri from Baku 
and during those years, she did not receive any financial support from the government. 
‘I  do  not  receive  any  pensions  neither  from  the  Armenian  nor  the  Georgian 
government… I worked and paid my taxes for twenty-five years in Baku...  Even 
when I moved to Gyumri, the government did not provide us with social support 
because it was a financially very complicated situation. I sell  everything in this 
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small shop (in the original ‘butka’), and that is how I make money, nowadays.’ 
Tamara, 68
A possible interpretation of Tamara’s account is the unequal distribution of the financial 
support. Tamara does not receive any pensions or benefits from the Armenian – or the 
Azerbaijani government since she did not pay her taxes in Armenia, and she could not find 
a job after forcibly relocating to Armenia but is also is no longer an Azerbaijani resident to 
be able  to  claim her  pension.  Unlike  Shalala  and Zubeyda,  Tamara  contributed  to  the 
Azerbaijani economy and paid her taxes regularly for twenty-five years. In the case of 
Shalala, she was a housewife in Spitak before the displacement and she contributed to the 
grey  economy  while  she  was  living  in  Armenia,  as  well.  That  was  one  of  the  main 
distinguishing factors between Shalala and Tamara. For Zubeyda, she was a housewife and 
after displacement, she lost her husband and financial stability and with her IDP status, she 
managed to get the different types of social support from the Azerbaijani government. The 
issue  that  emerged  among  participants  was  the  IDP  women  like  Zubeyda  who  have 
financial  stability  and still  receive  the social  support  from the Azerbaijani  government 
because  of  having  an ethnic  privilege.  Meanwhile,  refugee  women from Armenia  and 
Azerbaijan like Shalala and Tamara face challenges for receiving such support. 
Taken together,  the narratives suggest that the access to the social  support of IDP and 
refugee women cannot be generalized but is shaped by nationality that in the context of 
welfare support can constitute ethnic privilege. The idea of being IDP portrayed, in the 
existing literature,  as more vulnerable and the dominant framing of IDP women in the 
society and literature appears as a singular feat: it makes social support accessible to them 
on the basis of losses in the NK conflict but also Azerbaijani ethnicity and nationality.  My 
research with the participants suggests that Armenian and Azerbaijani refugee women face 
discrimination and more challenges because of their ethnicity (Armenian Azerbaijani or 
Azerbaijani Armenian).  Due to the NK conflict  and displacement,  some women cannot 
receive any financial support. Armenian refugee women like Tamara have worked many 
years and regularly paid their taxes and thus, they qualify for these financial subsidies as 
much as Shalala and Zubeyda. This creates the unequal distribution of welfare among IDP 
and refugee  women and consequently,  this  inequality  worsens  the living  conditions  of 
underprivileged refugee women. 
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3.2.3 Ill-health of IDP and refugee women
Often  ill-health  of  IDP  and  refugee  women  was  directly  and  indirectly  affected  by 
precarious  living conditions,  as  many continued to live  in  the houses  with no or  little 
heating,  and  other  infrastructures  such as  water  supply,  electricity.  They  did  not  have 
access to the healthcare system, as well. Such topics have not been profoundly examined in 
the existing research materials and still remain as under-researched topic in relation to the 
NK conflict. An Azerbaijani IDP woman Ulnaz from Sumgayit told me:
‘In 1993, we left our comfortable and fancy living standards in Qubadli and moved 
to a dormitory room in Sumgayit. I needed to go to the ground floor from the third 
floor to do my laundry. We did not even have hot water... The dormitory standards 
were horrible, and because of these, my health was getting worse... After coming to 
Sumgayit, I suffered from illness, and in the end, I stayed at the hospital for more 
than a year.’ Ulnaz, 62, married, Azerbaijani working-class IDP woman, Sumgayit
Ulnaz seemed to be very unhappy and tired during our interview. She and her family were 
living in a small cramped house where eleven people shared three rooms. Even though she 
attempted to hide it, it was apparent that she had some pain during the interview. Ulnaz did 
not want to talk about her illness, possibly for feeling shame of sharing such information 
with a male researcher. Some participants refused to talk about intimate issues because 
they considered me as a stranger on different levels (see, chapter 2). 
In  the  past,  Ulnaz  considered  herself  the  only  one  responsible  for  cleaning,  cooking, 
carrying hot water, taking care of her husband and three sons in a dormitory room. She told 
me that as a woman and mother of her family, she needed to carry water in 5l bottles three 
to four times every day. There was no access to hot water and electricity in the dormitory. 
In 1990s, IDP women like Ulnaz took care of their children, as the family could not afford 
to  pay for  the childcare.  All  of  these  responsibilities  can  be considered  as  part  of  the 
gendering  family  responsibilities  of  many IDP women like  Ulnaz.  Najafizadeh  (2013) 
envisaged IDP women’s one of the most serious difficulties as the continuing diseases and 
health  problems without analysing women’s gender roles.  Thus, the gendered practices 
where women are responsible for the traditional Azerbaijani family was one of the factors 
which contributed to worsening Ulnaz’s health condition. It is important to mention that 
the public healthcare system is not well accessible in Azerbaijan, and it is often necessary 
to bribe staff in hospitals to ensure better treatment (Kvinna till Kvinna, 2019). This means 
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the lack of a well-established public healthcare system was another factor which influenced 
the health conditions of many IDP women like Ulnaz. Ulnaz told me she did not have 
enough financial support for purchasing the prescription of medicine because she did not 
have a public healthcare scheme. Ulnaz sold her golden jewellery that paid for treatment 
but only for a year, when had to end it because of financial problems.
Unsurprisingly  there  is  a  strong  link  between  poverty  and  illness  of  IDP  women 
(Najafizadeh, 2013) and refugee women while there is no uniform situation of IDP and 
refugee  women.  Many  displaced  women  do  not  have  access  to  public  healthcare  and 
medicine,  taking  care  of  all  the  housework  in  cold,  humid  flats  or  dormitory  rooms 
contributes  to  worsening  the  ill-health  conditions  of  many  IDP  women.  This  can  be 
interpreted as working-class IDP housewives suffer more from the economic and medical 
consequences of the NK conflict in Azerbaijan. Now, I turn to participant Alla (Armenian 
refugee) living in Tbilisi.
‘All of these were just because of this massive transformation in my life... in March 
(2017)  after  seeing  the  coming  blood  from my  mouth,  and  I  figured  out  there  is 
something wrong… Then we went to the doctor, and he diagnosed me with breast 
cancer’.  Alla,  58,  divorced,  working-class  Georgian-Armenian  refugee  woman, 
Tbilisi.
Alla was a 58-year-old working-class Armenian woman from Baku and moved to Tbilisi in 
1988. She lived in an old Soviet style apartment block with her adult daughter. Their house 
was very cool when I visited them in August, but during winter it was cold and wet. Alla 
was tired and lay on the bed and had diagnosed with breast cancer several years ago. Still 
she had agreed to an interview. Alla had become a warrior of sorts, through practise, wish 
or through forces beyond consciousness, it is difficult to say. During the interview Alla 
surprised me with a strange smile after she talked about her challenge and hard times. This 
was a sign of empowerment and agency which showed that she was going through all of 
these changes (unwillingly) but it is the part of the life and resilience. She mentioned all 
the trauma which she was living through made her physically and psychologically sick. 
Even for a short time, she and her family slept in the streets, especially during frosty winter 
days in the 1990s. The days Alla lived in extreme poverty and precarity affected her health 
condition in the long-term. This means when Alla needed treatment,  and she could not 
afford it because Alla mentioned as in Azerbaijan, there was no well-established public 
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healthcare  system  in  Georgia.  Since  she  did  not  have  access  to  healthcare.  Alla’s 
socioeconomic condition has fallen from the middle-class to working-class, and thus she 
faced  poverty  and  ill-health  problems.  While  Alla  had  not  wanted  to  talk  about  her 
illnesses, I received a phone call from her sister in December 2019: Alla had died from 
breast cancer. The sister told me that Alla had been diagnosed with diabetes, tuberculosis, 
thyroid deficiencies, as well as breast cancer, a cumulative impact that her sister connected 
with her poor living conditions that accelerated the spread of cancer. 
These  two  stories  can  be  interpreted  in  the  context  of  poverty  and  precarious  living 
standards  of  Ulnaz  and  Alla.  Cumulative  illnesses  often  accompany  displacement, 
substandard housing and demanding gendered and gendering family responsibilities. These 
accounts suggest the poverty and precarious living conditions had a crucial impact on the 
health condition of IDP and refugee women in the context of NK conflict. This shows that 
how multidimensionality of these problems reproduces and strengthens the challenges of 
many IDP and refugee women. In this instance, intersectionality allows us to unravel and 
analyse  this  issue  by  brining  gender,  age,  ethnicity  (and  citizenship),  socioeconomic 
conditions. As I mentioned, there is not enough literature concerning the ill-health situation 
of  IDP  Azerbaijani  and  Armenian  refugee  women,  thus  my  research  contributed  to 
showing  the  mutual  constitution  between  the  poverty  and  ill-health  of  displaced  and 
refugee women.  
3.2.4 Militarization and motherhood
According to some of participants, militarization is one of the long-term consequences of 
the NK conflict which socioeconomically influenced their lives. Militarism is associated 
with a destructive foreign policy,  supported by an unjustified and intimidating military 
accumulation,  giving  the  right  to  use a  preference  for  the  practise  of  force  in  settling 
conflicts between states. The same stress appears in Klare's definition, as well: 
we can define 'militarism' as the tendency of a nation's military apparatus (which 
includes the armed forces and associated paramilitary, intelligence and bureaucratic 
agencies)  to  assume  ever-increasing  control  over  the  lives  and  behaviour  of  its 
citizens;  and  for  military  goals  (preparation  for  war,  acquisition  of  weaponry, 
development of military industries) and military values (centralization of authority, 
hierarchization,  discipline  and  conformity,  combativeness  and  xenophobia) 
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increasingly to dominate national culture, education, the media, religion, politics and 
the economy, at the expense of civilian institutions (Klare, 1978).
In 2019, the military costs  shared 4% of the GDP in Azerbaijan and 4.9% of GDP in 
Armenia (SIPRI, 2020).  This suggests these investments could help to provide a better 
socioeconomic condition for many IDP and refugees in Armenia and Azerbaijan instead of 
increasing the military budget. Therefore, militarization had a different impact on the lives 
of widows, mothers and single women participants. Zubeyda (Azerbaijani IDP) told me 
that ‘militarization caused problems such as the death and displacement and I did not want 
my  son  to  serve  in  the  military  service  but  if  the  Armenian  side  is  getting  stronger 
Azerbaijan  can  also  be  a  well-militarized  country’.  Meanwhile,  Anoush  (Armenian 
refugee) argued ‘it is not guaranteed I would not face the death of my son if the military  
system  regains  the  power’.  These  two  accounts  suggest  that  even  though  Zubeyda  is 
against her son serving in the military, she still supports militarization due to militarization 
of Armenian side. As I mentioned previously, Zubeyda lost her husband before the NK war 
(she  is  not  a  war  widow)  and  thus,  Zubeyda  did  not  want  her  son  to  serve  in  the 
compulsory  military  service.  Many  mothers  are  afraid  of  losing  their  children  in  the 
military service and therefore, one of the common practices in Azerbaijan is to bribe the 
military commissary (RadioFreeEurope, 2012). In this context, motherhood became a very 
sensitive issue for Zubeyda and Anoush because they do not want to lose their children due 
to the war. This can be seen as Kvinna till Kvinna (2019, p.13) argued ‘no mother should 
lose her son in war, but at the same time thought that militarization will make the country 
powerful’. Unlike Zubeyda, Anoush is against militarization because she lost her husband 
in the war (she is a war-widow) and thus, she does not want to face death because of war. 
What these women have in common is the idea of motherhood which is conceptualized on 
two different levels.  For Anoush, it  is universal and regardless of any situation,  she is 
against militarization. For Zubeyda, it is on the individual level and she wants to protect 
her  son but  support  militarization  in  Azerbaijan.  The reasons for  such support  can  be 
analysed as the propaganda of the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments which have also 
been  in  analysed  in  the  research  of  Kvinna  till  Kvinna  (2019)  organization  and  they 
suggest  this  propaganda  starts  from  schools,  universities,  televisions,  radios  and  the 
speeches of the officials. Therefore, such discourses directly influence the visions of many 
IDP  and  refugee  women,  too.  The  main  aim  is  to  create  an  ‘enemy  image’  against 
Azerbaijanis and Armenians in these discourses.  Thus, the differences between these two 
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widow mothers can be seen as one widow faced the death and precarity of war and another 
did not. Kvinna till Kvinna (2019) did not differentiate the categories of widow, single and 
married women which my research contributed to showing these women as heterogeneous 
groups concerning their positions in militarization. This also suggests there is a segregation 
among widow IDP and refugee women like Zubeyda and IDP and refugee war widows like 
Anoush concerning militarization and the long-term effects of NK conflict.
But serving in the military had long-term effects as  Elnaz, (Azerbaijani IDP) highlighted 
‘my son had health problems and thus, they did not call him for the military. If my son had 
served in the military, now he could find a better job with a higher salary’. This account 
also indirectly supported militarization because the mother wanted her son to attend the 
military service to have a better living standard. This suggests how the welfare system is 
militarized  through  the  compulsory  military  service  in  Armenia  and  Azerbaijan.  As 
Najafizadeh (2013) argued, women can be incorporated into militarisation through their 
relationship  to  men,  but  only if  their  roles  are  as  mothers.  This  suggests  that  military 
service  is  also  one  of  the  main  influence  mechanisms  of  Azerbaijani  and  Armenian 
governments through the NK conflict.  Therefore, it complexifies the welfare support by 
promising  some privileges  to  the  citizens  who serve  in  the  military.  Even though the 
military system is mandatory in both countries, there are many people who are unable to 
join  the  military  service  such  as  Elnaz’s  son.  This  implies  the  governments  promote 
welfare  through  the  militarization  and  many  people  accept  this  because  of  the 
socioeconomic privileges. However, I shall provide a well-detailed analysis of this in the 
upcoming chapter (see, chapter 4).
Refugee women participant, Tamara (Armenian refugee) who did not have children argued 
that  ‘the  process  of  militarization  worsens  the  lives  of  IDPs and refugees  who live  in 
poverty  and  many  young  male  soldiers  are  killed  in  the  borders  because  of  this 
propaganda’. This narrative contradicts with what Elnaz and Zubeyda argued because like 
Anoush, Tamara is also against militarization. Tamara is not a married or mother, but she 
clearly  refused  the  militarization  because  of  its  consequences  not  only  for  mothers  or 
widows but also for all IDPs and refugees coming from the working-class. This suggests 
Tamara  considers  the  economic  aspects  of  militarization,  negatively,  meanwhile  Elnaz 
approached  it  unwillingly  positively  while  she  argued  her  son’s  situation.  One  of  the 
possible interpretations can be that Elnaz approaches militarization from the perspectives 
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of her son’s economic well-being. Unlike Elnaz, Tamara considered it more holistically 
and thus, she refused the process of militarization.
IDP and refugee women come from diverse backgrounds and their intersectional identities 
as  widows,  mothers,  and  class  influence  their  approach  towards  the  process  of 
militarization.  There is  no united image of IDP and refugee women when it  comes to 
militarization. Some women accept militarization because of the propaganda (the enemy) 
and  individual  economic  conditions.  Meanwhile,  some  women  refuse  the  process  of 
militarization  because  of  their  fear  of  losing  beloved  sons  and  collective  economic 
challenges. It does not change the fact that these women are not always pro-militarization 
or anti, the more important point is that through the legacies of Armenian and Azerbaijani 
governments, their perception of militarization change. These changes are either through 
the welfare policies, or the government propaganda against the ‘enemies’ or their personal 
experiences of the war. However, militarization still has the long-term effects on the lives 
of IDP and refugee women and it increases the poverty among women in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.
3.3 Silences about sexual violence
As I argued in the  chapter 2, there are some sensitive issues that the participants did not 
want to talk about, and possible experiences of sexual violence and rape are the examples 
for this.  To discuss sexual matters/violence is likely to traumatic and shameful, not to be 
discussed with a ‘male researcher’. As a male researcher, I was considered as ‘other’ to 
develop  this  conversation  and  most  of  the  participants  changed  the  topic  in  different 
direction when I  indirectly  asked about the ‘potential  rape’ cases. There might also be 
effort to forget or not relive a traumatic experience in the telling.  Aydan describes the 
gendered and ethical dimension of war related rape in Azerbaijan.
‘Well,  I used to work as an interpreter for a foreign researcher who conducted 
interviews with IDPs in the regions of Azerbaijan. Over time, I realized that women 
respondents’ biggest fear was being raped by the Armenian soldiers. Meanwhile, 
male  respondents’  fear  was  the  ‘honour’  of  their  wives,  daughters,  sisters  and 
mothers. There was even a story that I have witnessed. A man advised his son that 
if Armenian soldiers come to our house, you should kill your mother, sister and 
grandmother before the enemy does! If they catch you, you can handle it because 
you are a man.’ Aydan, IDP, Switzerland/Baku
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This account seems to confirm the importance of ‘honour’ in the patriarchal Armenian and 
Azerbaijani  societies  where women are seen as objects more than subjects in NK war. 
Women’s rape was often considered a shameful experience for society is one reason that 
women participants were hesitant for talking about these experiences. The perspectives of 
hegemonic  masculinities  silenced these women’s  voices  about  rape and thus,  women’s 
experiences  and fears developed over the years.  In fact Selimovic (2012) reported that 
women  anticipated  this  response  in  their  families:  their  biggest  fear  of  losing  their 
‘honours’ was not being a part of their family. This also suggests that some of the research 
participants attempted to protect their family honour by not mentioning these topics in my 
research as well.
The war-related fears were expressed by Kohar who was the only research participant from 
Nagorno  Karabakh,  who  had  helped  me  to  contact  other  potential  participants.  I 
interviewed Kohar online, and she seemed to be nervous because to be talking, for the first 
time,  with an Azerbaijani  queer researcher.  It  is  possible  that  Kohar  considered me as 
ethnically and sexually different compared to other researchers she has met previously. 
This can also suggest that as researcher, my ethnicity and queer identity were on the one 
hand, respected and on the other hand, it was questioned. 
‘During the war in the 1990s we lived our lives in fear for more than five months… 
I was a kid, and my mom was a newly married woman, and whenever her mother-
in-law and father-in-law went somewhere, they were locking up the door. She was 
always asking them not to lock the door due to the fear of rape by Azerbaijanis. 
They could come and do other horrible things to us. At least, if they did not lock the 
door, we could run. Once this kind of situation occurred and we were crying in the 
flat  just  because  of  this  fear…  some  women  said  Azerbaijani  men  had  raped 
Azerbaijani  women  in  Vanadzor11.’  Kohar,  26,  single,  middle-class  Armenian 
woman from Nagorno-Karabakh
The narrative of Kohar' suggests that ‘family honour’ and dependence on family members 
might in many cases aim to protect women from sexual violence. On the one hand, by 
locking the door, men aimed to protect the women members of the family. On the other 
hand, this lockdown increased the fear and insecurities of Kohar’s mother  because she 
could  not  escape  from the  house.  It  is  not  clear  from the  interview  how much  these 
experiences shaped Kohar’s own life as a long-term effect of NK conflict. Since she is the 
11 Vanadzor is a municipal community and the third-largest city in Armenia with a population of 90,000.
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representative of the new generation of Nagorno-Karabakh, thus she did not know how the 
stories or rumours of sexual violence shaped her life. 
Another  facet  that  complicated  the  gendered  notion of  family  honour was the  implicit 
suggestion that Azerbaijani soldiers raped Azerbaijani women in Vanadzor and blamed it 
on  Armenian  men.  Anoush  conversely  spoke  about  stories  that  Armenian  men  raped 
Armenian women and blamed Azerbaijani men. The scandal here is that these men are not 
only using ‘other’ women to punish other (Azerbaijani or Armenian) men but using ‘their 
own’  women  to  tarnish  other  men.  The  occurring  problem is  that  I  did  not  have  the 
participants to talk about these issues which occurred in 1990s and thus, the rumours about 
the  sexual  violence  still  remain  unknown.  However,  what  is  significant  is  that  what 
Kohar’s  mother  thought  or  rumoured  that  it  might  really  happen.  This  highlights  the 
brutality of using rape as weapon of war. This not only suggests the issue of rape was also 
constructed to increase the hate between two ethnicities but also the way of using women 
as  ‘inferior’  or  ‘sexual  objects’.  Raping  these  women  was  a  part  of  sexual  pleasure 
(without  consent)  to  feel  superior  over  another  ethnicity  and show that  Azerbaijani  or 
Armenian woman is already ‘dirty’ or ‘raped’. So, again it is something connected with the 
‘honour of women’.  In other words,  the rape of women might  be a part  of the sexual 
pleasure of perpetrators  due to  the NK war,  but  it  was constructed as ‘ethnicity-based 
rape’.
To sum up, the fear of potential rape and silence about it were the main obstacles for my 
IDP and refugee  women participants.  Many participants  remained  silent  when I  asked 
about rape because of the shame of talking about sexual violence. Aydan’s and Kohar’s 
narratives suggested that the fear of rape situations included the fear to lose the honour and 
family. While highlighting gender, the stories refract the role of ethnicity which suggests 
how the intersectional perspectives contributed to unravelling this. This suggests ethnicity 
was  refracted  by  gender  in  sexual  violence  because  the  war  shaped  gender  relations 
differently. 
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have investigated the long-term impacts of the NK conflict in the lives of 
IDP and refugee women by analysing these impacts from an intersectional perspective. 
Through the ethnographic research, among participants, I uncovered the ethnic privilege of 
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some  Azerbaijani  IDP women  in  comparison  with  Azerbaijani  and  Armenian  refugee 
women.  The  social  support  (provided  by  the  government)  is  more  accessible  for  IDP 
Azerbaijani women because of their Azerbaijani ethnicity. Meanwhile, Azerbaijani refugee 
women face more challenges and in Armenia,  some refugee women are not entitled to 
receive those benefits. This also destroyed the ‘the most vulnerable’ group image of IDP 
women (Najafizadeh, 2019) because the stories of refugee participants suggested their lives 
are  more  vulnerable  compared  to  IDP women.  I  uncovered  also  the  mutual  relations 
between the relative poverty and ill-health of IDP and refugee women because in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan the healthcare system is highly corrupted and there are no public healthcare 
schemes.  Due to  lack  of  finance,  most  of  IDP and refugee  women cannot  access  the 
healthcare system and consequently, they suffer the diseases for years. 
The  chapter  thereby  contributed  to  enrichening  the  existing  literature  concerning  the 
complex  living  conditions  of  IDP and  refugee  women  from Armenia,  Azerbaijan  and 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  In  the  cultural  discrimination  against  IDP  and  refugee  women,  I 
showed how the notion of ethnicity is not only constructed through the binary Armenian 
versus  Azerbaijani  but  also  the  rural  versus  urban.  Therefore,  many  IDP and  refugee 
women participants were discriminated in the bigger cities of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Through the interviews, I suggested cultural discrimination strengthens marginalization of 
IDP and refugee women which creates unemployment and financial instability for them. 
On the  section  about  social  privileges  and  the  role  of  ethnicity,  I  revealed  the  ethnic 
privilege  of  IDP  Azerbaijani  women  who  managed  to  get  the  support  of  Azerbaijani 
government  easily  in  comparison  with  refugee  women  from Armenia  and  Azerbaijan. 
However,  in the following section about ill-health,  I  demonstrated there are also many 
under-privileged IDP women who come from the working-class families and they are not 
able to maintain their socioeconomic conditions only with the support of the Azerbaijani 
government. By doing so, I examined how the lack of access to the healthcare facilities 
challenge IDP and refugee women’s everyday lives.
I contributed to examining the role of militarization in lives of IDP and refugee women by 
exploring  differences  among  married,  widow  and  single  women  participants  (unlike 
Kvinna till  Kvinna 2019).  The interesting finding among the participants  was that  war 
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widow and single women were against militarization and meanwhile,  widow (non-war) 
and married women indirectly supported militarization because of financial conditions and 
government propaganda. Following that, my research was sexual violence and its long-
term impacts on the lives of IDP and refugee women participants. However, most of the 
participants refused to talk about it: first because I was considered of I, male researcher, 
and they considered talking about sexual violence to me as shameful action; secondly, they 
were afraid of remembering such fears and re-traumatizing themselves. 
To put all of these together, the long-term impacts of the NK conflict still highly influence 
the daily  lives  of IDP and refugee women.  However,  the socioeconomic  conditions  of 
these women may differ because of their age, ethnicity, marital and class status. Analysing 
the conflict through the intersectional lenses contributed to finding the hidden elements of 
the  everyday  lives  of  women  and  the  impacts  of  NK conflict  on  their  socioeconomic 
conditions.  Therefore,  analysing the lives of IDP and refugee women as heterogeneous 
groups (from intersectional perspective) is one of the required steps for understanding the 
long-term impacts of the NK. 
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Chapter 4: Queer and LGBT Experiences in the Context 
of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
4.1 Introduction
There  are  no  well-established  academic  research  materials  regarding  the  LGBT/queer 
community  in  the  region and  especially,  less  in  the  context  of  the  Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. By focusing on LGBT/queer-identified people from Armenia and Azerbaijan, this 
chapter  begins  to  examine  the  impact  on  the  conflict  more  systematically.  I  aim  to 
answer does  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict  influence  the  lives  of  the  LGBT/queer 
community in Armenia and Azerbaijan? How might  the militarization  of society  shape 
gender, class and ethnicity differently?
Research  of  ILGA Europe,  Carroll  and  Quinn  (2009)  and  van  der  Veur  (2007)  have 
examined the general situation of the queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan and 
they also argued the role of hostile environments against them. However, their research 
materials  have  not  addressed  the  conflict  in  NK,  and  this  did  not  contribute  to 
understanding the current situation of LGBT/queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Many Armenian, Azerbaijani and foreign social scientists know something about the role 
of  NK  conflict  in  the  negative  discourse  of  queer  community  (see,  for  example, 
Shahnazarian 2016; Carroll and Quinn 2009; van der Veur 2007) but hardly anyone has 
written about  them. Shahnazarian (2016) has also argued that  hostilities  against  LGBT 
individuals in Armenia are in part fuelled by the NK conflict. However, Shahnazarian does 
not  systematically  analyse  the  role  of  militarization  and  its  interconnections  with 
unemployment and heteronormativity in the lives of LGBT individuals. The research to 
demonstrate  the  mutual  constitution  between  the  NK conflict  and  militarization  which 
fosters hate against the queer community.
The chapter  examines  LGBT/queer  practices  and interactions  through two themes  that 
emerged  from the  data.  The first  section  focuses  on the  general  situation  and cultural 
discrimination of the community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. I explore the increasing hate 
towards queer individuals and the existence and resistance of the queer community. The 
second section focuses on militarization and its interconnections with opportunities on the 
labour  market  and  pronatalist  policies.  I  investigate  what  kind  of  consequences  of 
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militarization of the NK conflict arise and how this exacerbates processes of exclusion and 
discrimination against the queer/LGBT community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
4.2 Anti-LGBT/queer environments and hate crimes
I draw on the stories of five participants (Lilit, Hayk, Eldar, Leyla and Vardan) in this and 
upcoming  section.  In  total,  I  tried  to  interview  five  members  of  the  Armenian  queer 
community members but only Hayk, Vardan and Lilit accepted my invitation.  Lilit and 
Vardan lived in the Armenian capital of Yerevan and Hayk was living in the Netherlands. 
The interview process was via the internet and I was not able to visit Yerevan due to the 
political relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All three respondents from Armenia 
had longstanding experience in defending the rights of Armenian queer individuals. Hayk, 
Lilit and Vardan were the middle-class queer representatives of the Armenian society but 
all  of  them  faced  discrimination  because  of  their  different  gender  identities  in  the 
conservative Armenian society. 
Hayk who had recently immigrated to the Netherlands told me about the brutal against him 
in Armenia.  Hayk highlighted  ‘’the attackers  wanted to catch and kill  me. Two of my 
friends  were  seriously  injured  and  seven  friends  suffered  other  injuries.’  The  hostile 
environment against Hayk and his friends suggest that the queer community is rejected in 
Armenian society and the attack fostered Hayk’s decision to emigrate to a safer country 
like  the  Netherlands.  Even  though  homosexuality  is  legalized  in  Armenia  since  2003 
(Carroll  and Quinn, 2009), Armenian society has a low tolerance towards LGBT/queer 
individuals in the country. Thus, some of the queer activists like Hayk cannot continue 
their activism and gender awareness in Armenia because their lives are in danger. This 
short story of Hayk gives some details about the homophobic approach of the Armenian 
society towards Hayk and many other LGBT/queer individuals. 
Hayk is  not  the only LGBT/queer  community  representative  who faced such violence. 
Lilit, is a transgender Armenian queer rights activist who lives in Yerevan in Armenia. She 
gained prominence through a presentation of the situation of Armenian transgender women 
in  the  Armenian  parliament.  After  her  presentation  the  speaker  of  the  parliament  had 
forced her to leave the building.  Lilit  recounted that ‘people started to write on social 
media ‘Find and kill Lilit’... I was afraid of leaving my house for more than two months... I  
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did  not  even  go  to  the  supermarket’.  Lilit’s  narrative  suggests  that  visibilization  of 
transgender  women on the political  level,  ends up with the homophobic attacks  in the 
Armenian society. This attack is not only a violent act but also a homophobic resistance for 
not  accepting  transgender  women  in  the  political  arena  in  Armenia.  In  order  to  save 
herself, Lilit should have isolated herself from the Armenian society for a short period of 
time in order to save her life from the brutal attacks.  Together, Lilit’s and Hayk’s stories 
begin to show the hostile and homophobic environment for the people who openly identify 
as LGB/queer or transgender. These experiences also suggest that there is a community of 
people  in  Armenia  who  share  the  same  fears  and  suffer  the  hostile  and  homophobic 
environment. Such hostility allows LGBT/queer individuals to develop a collective identity 
which is LGBT/queer community. 
Concerning respondents from Azerbaijan, I was only able to interview Eldar and Leyla. 
Eldar and Leyla were well-known activists in the Azerbaijani LGBT/queer community and 
open to be interviewed by me in Baku, Azerbaijan. Eldar is a BA student with a working-
class  background  and  Leyla  is  a  middle-class  lesbian  from  the  Lezghin  community. 
Lezghins  are  a  Northeast  Caucasian  ethnic  group  native  predominantly  to  southern 
Dagestan, Russia and north-eastern Azerbaijan and 193,300 Lezghins live in Azerbaijan 
and according to 2009 statistics largest  minority  in Azerbaijan (Markedonov, 2010). 
Eldar held that the situation of queer-identified people in Azerbaijan was not so different 
from Armenia. I have not faced violence, but many queer individuals were brutally beaten 
because of their feminine behaviour’. For instance, in September 2017, there were about 
hundred queers, mainly transgenders and transsexuals were arrested and tortured in a two-
week series of raids in Baku and after an international protest, the Azerbaijani authorities 
released all the detainees in early October (Safarova, 2017). Even though homosexuality is 
legal since 2000, the society and government are still homophobic (van der Veur 2007). 
This also suggests that the situation in Azerbaijan is not that different from Armenia and I 
aim to show this in detail while analysing the existing legislations and the discourses of my 
respondents.
Except  for  the  homophobic  society,  Eldar  also pointed  ‘unemployment  of  LGBT/queer 
community is one of the main obstacles for acceptance’.  Many LGBT/queer individuals 
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cannot find job opportunities in Azerbaijan because many employers and companies refuse 
to offer such opportunities. Therefore, most of the time, coming out as LGBT/queer carries 
a  high  risk  of  losing  the  job  and  becoming  unemployed.  This  begins  to  suggest  that 
discrimination against queer individuals impacts on their socioeconomic conditions which 
will be examined in the upcoming section. 
The queer individuals, in Azerbaijan, also attempts to develop a collective identity such as 
the queer community and this process is seemed to be challenging as in Armenia. Many 
challenges of Azerbaijani LGBT/queer community are similar to Armenian LGBT/queer 
community in terms of homophobic society, crimes, attacks, coming out, unemployment 
and others. These similar challenges are because of the same historical development and 
colonial history (Tlostanova, 2012) of Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the Azerbaijani 
LGBT/queer  community  faces  more  challenges  in  terms  of  the  autocratic  regime  in 
Azerbaijan. As I previously mentioned, Azerbaijan becomes a more autocratic post-Soviet 
state unlike Armenia. This also suggests that LGBT/queer liberation goes through more 
challenging times in Azerbaijan. The two-week series of raids in 2017 was a good example 
of how the autocratic Azerbaijan organized such raid in order to arrest many LGBT/queers. 
I  aimed  to  show  these  challenges  and  homophobic  behaviour  of  these  societies  to 
understand  the  regional  context  before  I  move  to  the  relations  between  the  Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and the LGBT/queer community of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, 
it was important to have a broader picture of the region and the intolerance against LGBT/
queer community.  Now, I turn to analytically  examine the NK conflict  and the role of 
militarization on the lives of this community.
4.3 Societal militarization and its effects on LGBT/queer lives
As I have shown in chapter 1, the sparse available literature suggests that in S. Caucasus 
being a queer is considered unethical, and the previous section begins to suggest how being 
considered homosexual, genderqueer or transgender can pose grave physical dangers such 
as physical and psychological violence, torture, and even death (also Shahnazarian, 2016). 
Research participants coded as gay or queer men (in binary understanding) in particular 
highlighted the role of militarization of the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies in the wake 
of  the  war  in  Nagorno-Karabakh  which  create  a  highly  homophobic  and  hostile 
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environment for the acceptance and development of queer community in the region. In 
2016,  Armenia  was  ranked  third  and  Azerbaijan  eleventh,  in  the  global  militarization 
index, that refers to the levels of military spending on the armed forces in relation to the 
GDP  and  in  comparison,  to  other  sectors  of  society  (Mutschler,  2017).  Concerning 
masculinities, this issue is more related to them because the military service is mandatory 
for men in both countries. In other words, the military system is one of the institutions 
which  is  actively  engaged  in  the  gendering  process  of  these  societies  which  demands 
men’s  mandatory  participation  in  the  military  service.  Therefore,  closer  integration  of 
military and nationalism (promotion of the victory over the Nagorno-Karabakh) is seen as 
the most prominent elements of these societies (Abrahamyan, 2017). As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, through different channels, these Armenian and Azerbaijani governments 
promote the national discourses by using the conflict as a tool. Due to the ongoing NK 
conflict, Azerbaijani and Armenian identities are often promoted through the discourses of 
nationalism  and  militarization  of  the  societies  which  strengthens  nationalism.  Both 
governments promoted the increasing role of the military in society such through different 
tools. For instance, in Armenia the government's ‘Nation-Army Concept’ is a programme 
by the Ministry of Defence to increase the military's role in society by organizing special 
trainings  and  providing  special  subjects  about  military  in  schools  (Kucera,  2017). In 
Azerbaijan,  Akhundov  (2017)  highlights  the  militaristic  propaganda,  including  in 
elementary schools where students are dressed in military uniforms and have to march 
repeating slogans such as ‘Our homeland is indivisible; our martyrs are immortal’. The 
research  participants  suggested  that  the  mutual  enforcement  of  militarization  and 
nationalism influence the LGBT/queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
‘When it  comes to military and government propaganda, queers attempt to stay 
away from these things… Many queer individuals refuse to join the army because 
they are not accepted to [openly] serve in the military and these values go against 
their values. They do not want to fight against Azerbaijanis.’ Hayk, 27, working-
class, Armenian queer, Netherlands
Hayk suggested that Armenian LGBT/queer people do not join the military because they 
are not accepted,  and they do want  to participate  in  the war against  Azerbaijan which 
implies some queers reject nationalism (of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict).  The International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights’ (IHF) 2007 report clarifies that since 2001, based 
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on  Order  No.  378  by  the  Armenian  Minister  of  Defence,  homosexuality  has  been 
considered  an  illness  and,  thus,  homosexuals  are  considered  unfit  for  military  service. 
However, Eldar’s narrative suggests a different opinion on this:
‘the queer community is not a part of the military in Azerbaijan. Not because they 
do not support the war, but mainly because the system does not want to include 
them in this process. If we are not included due to our gender identities, this means 
we are not considered an important actor of the NK conflict’ Eldar, 22, working-
class, Azerbaijani queer, Baku
Eldar’s argument suggests that the LGBT/queer community does not serve in the military 
because of the suppression of non-traditional sexual identities. There is also evidence that 
gay  men conceal  their  sexuality  and join  the  military.  Carroll  and Quinn (2009) have 
shown that the male12 homosexuals serve in the Armenian military service while hiding 
their sexuality. The term homosexual is widely used in the official state documents both in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and therefore, the usage of queer or LGBTQI+ is not common.  In 
some cases, if homosexuality is revealed LGBT/queer soldiers were sent to psychiatric 
hospitals and diagnosed with schizophrenia (ibid). The orders with the same content have 
been accepted in Azerbaijan, as well (Dadashzadeh and Paitjan, 2020).  There are stories 
about  rape  of  suspected  homosexuals  in  the  military  both  in  Armenia  and Azerbaijan 
(ibid).  This  suggests  that  there  is  no  single  perspective  of  queer  identified  individuals 
supporting  militarization.  Therefore,  Eldar  implies  that  if  there  was  a  more  tolerant 
approach towards queer people in the military,  more LGBT/ queer individuals  join the 
military.  They might  assume that  through participating in the military,  queer men will 
become  full  citizens.  At  the  same  time,  it  casts  doubts  on  Hayk’s  portrayal  of  the 
LGBT/queer community as anti-militarist. It is important to highlight that Eldar’s point has 
a strong connection with the notion of ‘sexuality and citizenship’ which brings me to the 
economic consequences of NK conflict on the lives of queer/LGBT individuals
Economic effects of the exclusion from military service 
‘My best friend is an Armenian queer, and he did not join the army, and then, he got  
the paper says he is ‘homosexual and exempted from the conscription’... It has been 
three years since he graduated and cannot find a job in his field. He is very talented, 
but the law does not allow him to work in the public sector… He is discriminated 
12 Women are not obliged to serve in the military service (Carroll and Quinn, 2009).
62
because he is queer and not supporting the military.’ Leyla, 32, middle-class, queer, 
Lezghin, Baku
The pathologization of homosexual and queer men in the military demonstrates that queer 
individuals are not treated as equal citizens in Armenia and Azerbaijan – where serving 
your  country  is  considered  a  key  element  of  citizenship  for  able  bodied  men.  As 
Richardson (2000) argues, sexuality and citizenship should be part of full rights of all the 
citizens  in  the  context  of  legal,  economic  and  social  participation.  The  author 
conceptualizes the sexuality and citizenship by defining it as a status involving a number of 
distinctive  rights  claims,  some are  recognized  as  legal  by the  state  institution  and are 
legitimate.  In this  analysis,  one of the sub-streams can be identified ‘as seeking rights 
within social institutions: public validation of various forms of sexual relations’ (ibid).  In 
this  context,  the  interviews  show  that  the  exclusion  from  military  has  broader 
ramifications. Employment in the public sector, for example, legally requires certification 
of the successful completion of the mandatory military service in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
(see, for example, Law of 1993 on Armed Forces of Azerbaijan; Law of the Republic of 
Armenia on Alternative Service). To some extent the private sector also requires for such 
document. Both Eldar and Lilit told me that in the private sector ‘some companies demand 
the successful completion of mandatory military service and some of them do not’. To date, 
there  was  no  research  on  the  importance  of  completion  of  military  service  for  men’s 
employment  in  the  private  sector.  These  findings  suggest  that  due  to  the  mandatory 
military  service,  queer  individuals  might  be  unemployed  to  a  higher  degree  than 
heterosexual men in these countries. These narratives also imply that queer individuals are 
excluded  from military  service,  and they  are  not  seen  as  part  of  the  ‘great  nation’  of 
Armenia or Azerbaijan. This shows how militarization is diffused to the employment of 
queer individuals in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and thus, many queers cannot apply for the 
desired job positions or they end up being unemployed for a long time.
 
The interviews further uncovered that class background mattered in this  issue. Both in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, participants argued that LGBT/queers from upper-class are not 
affected from such processes. Vardan argued that ‘queers from the working or middle class 
are discriminated based on their sexualities and socioeconomic status, meanwhile queers 
from the upper class do not have to face such problems’. According to him and Eldar, 
those LGBT/queers avoided military service by bribing military commissions (see, also 
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Immigration  and  Refugee  Board  of  Canada  2014;  Transparency  International  2015; 
Ghukasyan 2020) and had less interest in working in the public sector. This implies that 
LGBT/queer individuals who come from upper-class do not have to deal with challenges 
such  as  joining  the  military  or  working  in  the  public  sector  because  of  their  good 
socioeconomic conditions. 
For  the  majority  though,  the  exclusion  from,  military  service  impacted  employment 
opportunity  and prosperity  particularly  in  the  context  of  countries  with relatively  high 
unemployment  like  Armenia.  Hayk  suggested  that  this  negatively  impacted  on  the 
visibility of queers:  ‘When you have a country which is founded based on the traditional 
values,  and you do not have a strong economy, it  is  obvious queer people will  not be 
visible  in  society.’  Hayk  implies  that  queer  representation  requires  relative  economic 
independence – which was jeopardised in the wake of the NK conflict. Militarization does 
not refer to only serving in the army but also having a prosperous life in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan.  Since  most  of  the  queers  are  excluded  from  the  system  or  there  is  no 
alternative  for  the  system,  queer  community  faces  structural  discrimination.  Therefore, 
Hayk implies that queer representation requires a strong economy and labour market where 
LGBT/queer  people  can  live  independently  to  sustain  the  quality  of  lives.  For  both 
countries, economic representation of the queer community remains a complicated topic 
since economic independence also means social and political independence for the queer 
individuals.  
In relation to economic and political representation, coming out also becomes a challenge 
for queer/LGBT community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Lilit mentioned that ‘coming out 
becomes a very dangerous practice in Armenia because of the intolerance towards LGBT 
community’.  The  discourses  of  other  participants  also  suggested  that  the  threat  of 
unemployment and job loss as well as cultural discrimination and hate crimes reduced the 
willingness of queer people   to come out in their environments. As long as, they do not 
come out  in  their  environments  they  will  remain  invisible.  However,  coming out  also 
carries a high risk for many LGBT/queer individuals because of the homophobic societies 
where they live. Example of Hayk showed, he left their country in order to escape from the 
homophobic  Armenian  society.  Hayk  had  applied  for  was  granted  asylum  in  the 
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Netherlands and many other LGBT/queers also study in other western countries, which 
indicates a further loss of critical queer perspectives and visibility in these counties.
To sum up, my analysis shows that the militarization of Armenia and Azerbaijan due to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict negatively influences LGBT/queers’ economic conditions such 
as employment, financial income and social and political representation. While legislation 
exempts  queer  men from the mandatory military service,  for those unable to bribe the 
authorities, this exemption comes at the cost of pathologization and sectioning in mental 
institutions as well as long-term effects on employment opportunities in the public sector 
(and some cases,  private  sector).  The militarization  of  society  thereby contributes  to  a 
strengthening of heteronormativity. As I will show in the following section, it is associated 
with pronatalist heteronormative policies. 
Heteronormativity and pronatalism in the context of militarization
‘We live in a post-Soviet and traditional Armenia where heteronormativity rules 
us... ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’, ‘Get married to a woman and have kids’, this is what 
Armenian society expects from us. If we don’t have babies in Armenia, we won’t be 
able to preserve the Armenian identity anymore.’ Vardan, 23, middle-class, queer 
Armenian, Yerevan
Vardan  considers  the  emphasis  on  heteronormative  reproduction  in  the  service  of  the 
nation as another  societal  challenge for the queer community  in Armenia.  The idea of 
‘Greater Armenia’13 is promoted through militarization, where current Armenia needs to 
have  a  strong army which  can  be  achieved  with  the  support  of  more  Armenian  male 
soldiers. This also uncovers the reason behind the high military expenditures of Armenian 
and Azerbaijani governments which aim to sustain or expand its territories with the support 
of highly militarized regime and citizens.
It  thereby  participates  in  naturalising  both  a  primordial  ethnic  identity  (that  I  have 
problematised  in the previous  chapter)  as well  as  heteronormative  gender  order.  Some 
scholars argue that the Armenian Genocide helped unifying Armenians and to underscore 
the importance of the necessity of protecting their Armenian ethnicity (de Waal, 2010) and 
13  Greater Armenia (or great Armenia) is an Armenian ethno-nationalist concept referring to areas within —
the Armenian Highland in 2nd century BCE which are currently and have historically been mostly populated  
by Armenians and the idea of a re-unification of this land with Armenia (Hovannisian, 2007). 
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thus,  declining  fertility  rate  can cause the disappearance  of  the Armenian  ethnicity.  In 
2017, the Armenian government proposed a policy plan to increase Armenian’s population 
from  currently  three  to  four  million by  2040  (Arakelyan,  2017).  This  scheme  was 
supported through a variety of measures such as subsidies of family housing and increased 
child allowances (Allen and Holding 2019; Avery and Lazdane 2010; Kocharyan 2020). 
Such  pronatalist  policies  aim  also  to  support the  gendered  conception  of  citizenship: 
heterosexual  men serve to  the  nation  in  the military,  women through producing many 
children to support this system. Women are encouraged to produce babies for the nation, 
including more ‘soldiers’ to realise the ambitions of ‘Greater Armenia’. Naturalisation here 
posits an ‘Armenian DNA’ (see, for example, Haber, M., et al. 2016; Abrahamyan 2017) 
that relies on and perpetuates traditional the gender roles, where heterosexual men serve in 
military  and women  produce  children.  This  is  a  good  example  of  mutual  constitution 
between  gender  and  ethnicity  from the  intersectional  perspective.  Such  arguments  are 
promoted in a context where the  fertility rate has decreased from 4.8 in 1960 to low 1.8 in 
2018 (The World Bank, 2018), and the threat of the loss of the ‘nation’ is seen as a fear of 
loss of the Armenian ethnicity – and Armenian gender order. At the same time, the low 
fertility  rate  suggests  that  many  Armenian  women  refuse  these  pronatalist  policies 
proposed by the Armenian government. 
Both construction of Armenian DNA and pronatalism configures the queer community as 
non-reproductive partnerships that threaten Armenian heritage as Vardan implied. This is 
one reason why the governmental and some societal actors are highly repressive towards 
the queer community. The promotion of ‘more kids=more soldiers’ (Shahnazarian, 2016) 
reinforces  the  militarization  of  society  and  increases  the  hostility  towards  the  queer 
community. Therefore, together with heteronormativity, militarization directly forces the 
heteronormative societies to promote ethnic identity and gender roles myths. However, the 
very specific context of this propaganda is the NK conflict because, from each side, there 
is a constructed ‘enemy’ image (see, for example, Shahnazarian 2017; Najafizadeh 2013; 
Terzyan  2018).  This  ‘enemy’  image  helps  Azerbaijani  and  Armenian  governments  to 
widely promote their  gender  propaganda and thus,  in the process,  non-heteronormative 
people are discriminated and seen as ‘perverts’ (Vardan).
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This repression also has psychological effects. Lilit suggested that the idea of same-sex 
marriage is ‘in our society, called mental illness’ – just as homosexuals were categorised 
in the military. This influences the perceptions of the queers in society such that same-
sexist  marriage is also opposed on the grounds of pronatalism.  As I demonstrated,  the 
marriage is an accepted institution only between a heterosexual man and woman and this 
suggests how gender and ethnicity become the important elements of the heteronormative 
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. In other words, intersectionality allows us to uncover 
these dimensions through the mutual constitution between gender and ethnicity. The issue 
of  reproduction  is  not  seen  as  a  process;  it  is  the  sign  of  ethnic  identity  and  gender 
normativity and the NK conflict extremely affects it. Since the LGBT/queer community do 
not promote any of these signs, they are not welcomed in these societies. The oppression 
against the non-heteronormative people remains as an obstacle to tackle for them. 
Very similar processes of the intersection of gender and ethnicity in pronatalist and pro-
militarist policies are also at work in Azerbaijan.
‘The most problematic side of Azerbaijani society is heteronormativity. What can 
we expect from a heteronormative society where the gender norms and roles pre-
determined? Queer people are not accepted because they cannot reproduce and 
strengthen our army…’ Eldar, 22, Azerbaijani queer, Baku
In  Azerbaijan,  the  concern  of  producing  more  soldiers  for  protecting  the  lands  of 
Azerbaijan from Armenia is the mirror version of aspiration for Greater Armenia. Since 
Azerbaijan has lost the territories in the NK conflict, it is too obsessed with growing its  
population,  including  future  soldiers  (see,  for  example,  Avdeev  2015;  Garenne  and 
Hohmann 2014). In Azerbaijan the fertility rate has decreased from 5.9 to currently 1.9 
(The World Bank,  2018) while  the overall  population  has grown by 7 million  from 3 
million in 1950 to over 10 million in 2019/2020 (State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan, 
2019).  The statistics  show that  Azerbaijan’s  population  growth is  approximately  seven 
million  since  1950  (ibid).   Therefore,  Eldar  argues  that  the  idea  of  ‘more  kids=more 
soldiers’ increases the hate against the queer community because they do not participate in 
the processes of militarization and population growth. In this context, the queer community 
is considered as non-contributory subjects of population growth to Azerbaijani society and 
thus, their visibilization is prevented with the terror on state and society levels. 
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We also see the pathologization where homosexual or transgender is considered ‘mental 
illness’ (see, for example, Nefes LGBT Azerbaijan Alliance 2015; van der Veur 2007). In 
Azerbaijan,  Fazil  Mustafa,  a  member  of  Azerbaijani  Parliament  14,  publicly  called 
homosexuality a disease and considered queer sex against nature and human morality, and 
called for its illegalisation (Nefes LGBT Azerbaijan Alliance, 2015). This underlines how 
the hate against the queer community is promoted through public figures in Azerbaijan. 
With respect to these policies and perspectives of the LGBT/queers, the two countries are 
thus surprisingly similar.
Even if,  Azerbaijani  society is  more multicultural  in comparison with the mono-ethnic 
Armenian  society,  it  also  oppresses  other  ethnicities  in  the  country.  For  while  the 
government claims that everyone who is born in the territories of Azerbaijan is Azerbaijani 
(see,  for  example,  Azerbaijan  State  News  Agency  2016;  Azerbaijani  Multiculturalism 
2016).  Practically,  the  pronatalist  and  pro-militarist  policies  target  predominantly  only 
Azerbaijani identity which is the construction of 1918 as I argued in chapter 1. Consider 
the case of Leyla, a lesbian and ethnic Lezghin:
‘I always feel that I am a member of marginalized community in Azerbaijan… My 
lesbian identity is always problematic... People think if I am a lesbian, it is because 
I have never had a man who can satisfy me. Some men think I can be their sexual  
partner if they buy me expensive cars and houses… and some women think that all 
I need is a husband and baby to understand the sense of motherhood… and others 
say ‘I do not have to live here’ because I am not Azerbaijani, I am Lezghin.’ Leyla, 
Baku
For Leyla, her lesbian identity is not accepted in the Azerbaijani heteronormative system 
that considers women’s primary function as citizens in reproduction (Shahnazarian, 2017). 
To be a lesbian does not fit the image of women in Azerbaijani heteronormative system. 
Her ethnic identification is considered problematic since Lezghins, the largest minoritized 
ethnic group in Azerbaijan attempted in 1994 to create the independent state of ‘Lezgistan’ 
(Markedonov, 2010). This independence movement was perceived as separatist against the 
united  Azerbaijan  and  thus,  Lezghins  were  considered  separatists  like  the  Armenian 
community of Nagorno Karabakh (ibid). Leyla had introduced herself as ‘a member of 
marginalized communities in Azerbaijan: a lesbian and Lezghin’. Being a member of two 
14  Fazil Mustafa is the MP from the ruling New Azerbaijan Party which won 72 of 125 seats in 2020-2024 
elections; the second largest party (the Civic Solidarity Party) won only three seats (Azernews, 2020). 
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disregarded communities in the Azerbaijani society discriminates her differently, and she 
faces  oppression on multiple  and intersectional  levels.  As a  non-reproductive and non-
Azerbaijani  woman  who  refuses  to  participate  in  the  heteronormative  pronatalist 
population  growth  project,  Leyla  is  considered  both  an  ethnic  and  gendered  threat  to 
Azerbaijani identity that is intersectionally constituted through heterosexual reproduction. 
From the perspective of ethnicity Leyla’s story implies that Azerbaijani ethnicity/identity 
is conceived on the state level as the only ‘unifying’ seemingly multicultural ethnicity into 
which  all  other  ethnic  groups  should  integrate  or  assimilate  (see,  for  example, 
Unrepresented  Nations  and Peoples  Organization  2017;  Markedonov  2010).  Therefore, 
Leyla is forced to give up on her Lezghin ethnic identity and integrate into the Azerbaijani 
political  identity.  From  the  perspective  of  gender,  heteronormative  society  denigrates 
Leyla’s lesbian identity because of her non-reproductive participation in this process of 
pronatalist and militarist process. Taken together, the intersectional perspective uncovers 
that gender and ethnicity are mutually constitutive in this process and thus, Leyla faces a 
multi-layered oppression unlike other queer/LGBT participants. 
To sum up, the analysis shows how the NK conflict fosters militarization in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan that reinforces the heteronormative idea of pronatalist population growth. With 
respect  to  policies  and  perspectives  of  the  participants,  the  two  countries  are  thus 
surprisingly similar because of the same colonial history and also the militarization due to 
the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  Members  of  the  LGBT/queer  community  becomes 
denigrated,  pathologized and because they do not participate in either of these projects. 
These  heteronormative  ideologies  are  intersectionally  co-constituted  with  militarisation 
and both reinforces hatred and render the LGBT/queer community invisible.
4.4 Conclusion
This  chapter  has  examined  how the  conflict  in  Nagorno-Karabakh shapes  the  lives  of 
LGBT/queer community. I asked in the introduction, does the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
influence the lives of the LGBT/queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan? How might 
the militarization  of society  shape gender,  class and ethnicity  differently?  The analysis 
pointed  to  the  impact  of  hate  attacks,  cultural  discrimination,  the  mutual  constitution 
between  militarization  and heteronormativity  and economic  and political  challenges  of 
LGBT/queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The brutal attacks and hate foster the 
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exclusion of queers in Armenia and Azerbaijan. This suggests that militarization – and its 
concomitant  of  pronatalism – contribute  both to  the denigration  and invisibilization  of 
LGBT/queers  in  the  Armenian  and Azerbaijani  societies.  There  is  a  strong connection 
between militarization and pronatalism that an intersectional sensibility makes visible and 
accountable. Analysing the LGBT/queer lives from intersectional perspectives contributed 
to uncovering the role of NK conflict in the high level of militarization in Armenian and 
Azerbaijani,  and  it  forces  queers  to  hide  their  sexual  identities.  In  this  instance, 
intersectional  perspective  uncovered  the  reasons  for  possible  higher  rate  of  the 
unemployment of LGBT/queer individuals or low level of representation in political  or 
social issues. This is one of the indirect findings and contributions of my research based on 
the analysis of the government regulations and interviews with some of the participants.
The mutual constitution between pronatalist policies and militarization has a direct impact 
on the continuation of discrimination against LGBT/queer community. The pronatalism is 
seen as a process of strengthening the ethnic identity and produce more male soldiers for 
winning  the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  Therefore,  this  research  uncovered  how  as  a 
consequence  of  the NK conflict,  Armenian  and Azerbaijani  societies  and governments 
terrorize against the LGBT/queer community by labelling them as ‘non-reproductive’ and 
‘mentally ill’ and this risks the existence of such community in the region.  
These findings also suggest that loss of critical LGBT/queer perspectives in the Armenian 
and Azerbaijani  societies  caused the  invisibilization  of  queer/LGBT community  in  the 
social  and  political  processes.  Through  intersectional  lenses,  I  uncovered  how  the 
LGBT/queer community is oppressed on different levels and how these oppressions are 
dependent on each other. Therefore, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict highly influenced (and 
still influencing) this community which brings me to the issue for inclusion of LGBT/queer 
perspectives in the peacebuilding initiatives of NK conflict. 
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Chapter 5: Rethinking Peacebuilding in the Nagorno-
Karabakh Conflict from an Intersectional Perspective
5.1 Introduction
Existing initiatives aiming at peacebuilding in the conflict on Nagorno Karabakh have been 
criticized for not including IDP and refugee women (see, for example, Najafizadeh 2013; 
Selimovic et al., 2012; Kvinna till Kvinna 2019). This chapter examines the role of current 
peace processes in the resolution of the NK conflict by analysing the webpages of relevant 
organisation  and  exploring  the  perspectives  of  IDP  and  refugee  women  and  queer 
community.  On  this  basis  I  reflect  how these  initiatives  would  have  to  change  more 
concretely if they were to include the participation and insights of IDP and refugee women 
and  LGBT/queer  subjects.  This  section  adds  concrete  examples  of  inclusion  and 
empowerment  that  are  often  missing  in  the  existing  literature  (see,  Najafizadeh  2013; 
Selimovic et al. 2012) 
The section seeks to illuminate both why and how are IDP and refugee women and LGBT/
queer community excluded from the current peacebuilding initiatives? And how does the 
peace process have to be re-imagined and re-designed to take the intersectional experiences 
and positionalities  of IDP and refugee women and queer community into account?  What 
this study adds to existing work is a more explicit focus on construction of sexuality and 
intersectional understanding of peace processes that have remained under-examined in the 
context  of  the  peace  processes  of  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  There  is  little  relevant 
literature to date that considers the mutual constitution of ethnicity, gender and sexuality 
for the peace processes of the NK conflict. Myrttinen and Daigle (2018) have emphasised 
the need to acknowledge that gender is not a binary categorisation of women and men 
only, and that non-heterosexual practices and identities should be considered when using a 
gender lens to understand the peacebuilding. The concerns of queer individuals need to be 
seen through a relational  lens,  that  is,  understanding the interplay  between gender  and 
other  social  distinctions  (identity  markers)  shaping  behaviour,  vulnerabilities  and 
peacebuilding  opportunities.  In  addition,  examining  the  gendered  and  intersectional 
dynamics of excluding these marginalized experiences can provide valuable insights into 
how existing male-dominated peace processes affect and underpin current peace initiatives 
The chapter aims to contribute to strengthening an intersectional approach in  current peace 
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processes and develop the notion of inclusivity including a wider array of marginalized 
concerns and insights.   The chapter  starts  by examining the male dominated-resolution 
process and exploring the reasons for the exclusion of IDP and refugee women and LGBT/
queer community. I go on to analyse the importance of an intersectional perspective and in 
conclusion  I  offer  suggestions  for  re-designing  current  peace  initiatives  by  taking  the 
experiences of IDP and refugee women and queer community.
5.2 Ongoing male dominance in existing peacebuilding initiatives
In the context of NK conflict, feminist researchers consider the dominance of privileged 
men in the peacebuilding  process  as one reason for  its  limited  results  (Jocbalis,  2016, 
pp.43-48).15 This  dominance  refers  to  the  widespread  exclusion  of  women  in  peace 
processes with the exception of select privileged women (see, for example, Najafizadeh 
2013; Shahnazarian 2014). The privileged women in the context of NK conflict mainly 
include upper class Armenian non-refugee and Azerbaijani non-IDP as well as few IDP 
women  (ibid).  Marginalized  women  who  are  working-class  IDP  and  refugees  and 
LGBT/queers are not included and an intersectional perspective that focuses on the co-
constitution of gender, ethnicity,  sexuality and class in the  current peace initiatives is 
ignored.  According to  Cobar  (2018),  there  is  no such thing  as  a  gender-neutral  peace 
process16.  Thus,  a  gender  perspective  leads  to  a  gender-sensitive  peace,  and  a  more 
inclusive  peace  which  starts  with  an  understanding  that  policies,  processes  and  peace 
agreements are gendered. This also means that in peace processes gender is one of the 
significant  categories  which  unravels  the  male-centred  policies  and  processes  of 
peacebuilding. As an analytical tool, gender allows us to investigate the power relations in 
the specific situations, and to comprehend the historical development of conflict from a 
wider perspective. 
Here I focus on the main peace initiatives which include the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which was established in 1994. The Minsk 
group  organised  twenty-three  high  level  summits  that  included  the  Armenian  and 
15 Azerbaijan is ranked 123rd with 0.650 (from a low of 0 to a high of 1) and Armenia is ranked 82nd with  
0.720 among 167 countries for the inclusion of women in the peace processes (Women Peace and Security  
Index, 2019).
16 Although the original definition by Cobar describes the approach using binary language on gender, this 
chapter broadens the perspective by widening the binary understanding and including the participation and 
needs of people with non-binary gender identities.
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Azerbaijani presidents between 1993 and 2003, as well as 140 meetings with Armenian 
and Azerbaijani ministers and other officials  on the territorial  integrity of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan; the legal status of  and security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, no date). On the official level the peacebuilders are mostly 
men,  except  a  few  well-known  women.  However,  these  women  were  predominantly 
included at the level of technical experts, and observers (Civil Society Monitoring Country 
Report, 2013). The masculinised structures of the OSCE Minsk Group have thus far failed 
to  change  the  Karabakh  status  quo  and  resolve  the  conflict  (Walsh,  2014).  It  is  also 
unlikely that the Minsk Group aims to bring a new peace plan in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
in the near future (ibid). There is no evidence that members of the queer community were 
included in these peace initiatives in Armenia and Azerbaijan. This again shows the binary 
construction of gender (man and woman) and the exclusion of LGBT/queer perspectives in 
the current process.
 
Regarding civil society peace initiatives, some nongovernmental organisations (NGOs)17 
participate  in  resolving  the  NK  conflict.  The  Azerbaijani  Community  of  Nagorno-
Karabakh of the Azerbaijan Republic  was established in 1992 to take part in the OSCE 
peace  negotiations  (The  Azerbaijani  Community  of  Nagorno-Karabakh,  no  date). 
According  to  their  out-dated  website,  among  the  chairman  and  the  22members  of  the 
executive  board  in  2009  there  was  only  one  woman,  Dr.  Havva  Mammadova,18 as  a 
representative  of  privileged  IDP women.  According  to  the  Community’s  social  media 
17 There are some women organizations in Armenia and Azerbaijan which work at the intersections of gender 
and peace, but those organizations do not have  the  official plans for the current peacebuilding initiatives. 
Additionally,  these  NGOs  have  not  been  taken  seriously  in  national  politics,  where  a  low  level  of  
participation by women limits  democracy  and decreases  the legitimacy of  the power  of  formal  political 
institutions. In Azerbaijan, for instance, ‘The Women’s Association for Rational Development’; ‘Azerbaijan 
Department  of  Transcaucasian  Women's  Dialogue’;  ‘Azerbaijan  Women's  Meclis  "Sevil"’;  ‘Center  for 
Development of Women Refugees and IDP-s’; ‘Center for Protecting Women's Rights’ and others. However,  
many of the Azerbaijani  IDP and refugee women participants did not know about the activities of such 
NGOs. In Armenia, for instance, ‘Bridge of hope’; ‘Martuni Women Assembly’; ‘Society without violence’;  
‘Women's resource center’; ‘Women for Development’ and others. The refugee participants (of Armenian 
ethnic origin) also did not know about the activities and agenda of such organizations. As a researcher, I 
attempted to reach out some of these organizations, but they were not interested in conducting interviews 
with me. Therefore,  I  have decided to mention some of these NGOs, but I  do not aim to analyse these 
organizations as the case study of this thesis. Firstly, these NGOs did not have a strong authority in this 
peacebuilding initiatives and secondly, their work was not accessible for the research participants. 
18 Mammadova is a professor of history and an Azerbaijani politician who from 2005 to 2010 served as a 
Member of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan. 
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accounts,  since  2018 the  chairman  is  another  man,  Tural  Ganjaliyev19 and  there  is  no 
information about the current members of the executive board. The activities described 
such  as  international  and  national  conferences  and  congresses  suggest  that  firstly, 
underprivileged IDP and refugee women are not present in their activities. Additionally, 
such activities are not accessible for working class IDP and refugee women because they 
will not be able to become a part of such ‘privileged’ group. Almost, none of the research 
participants knew about the activities of this peace initiative, which further suggests that 
there was no communication between underprivileged IDP women and the  Azerbaijani 
Community of Nagorno-Karabakh.  Except for this organization, there were some more 
peacebuilding initiatives (which were registered as NGOs), but as I previously mentioned 
the rise of autocratic regime suppressed such initiatives, as well. Therefore, many of these 
initiatives do not exist anymore and some of the founders immigrated to other countries as 
political asylum seekers.
In Armenia, Peace Dialogue NGO is an organisation founded in 2009 that describes itself 
as  non-religious,  and  non-political  (Peace  Dialogue  NGO,  no  date).  The  organization 
brings together human rights and peace activists from the Eastern Partnership countries, 
Russia  and Europe to promote the protection  of human rights and non-violent  conflict 
resolution  (ibid).  Among  the  six  members,  three  are  three  women  but  there  is  no 
information  about  their  background  (that  suggests  they  do  not  include  refugees  from 
Azerbaijan). Again, the Armenian refugees and queers who participated in the research had 
never  heard  about  it  and  they  were  excluded  from  its  initiatives  –  even  though  the 
chairman  of  Peace  Dialogue supports  the  empowerment  of  the  queer  community  in 
Armenia  (Civil  Society  Monitoring  Country  Report,  2013).  The  Peace  Dialogue  NGO 
thereby  seems  to  be  more  progressive  than  the  Azerbaijani  Community  of  Nagorno  - 
Karabakh since Armenia is more democratic than Azerbaijan (see, chapter 1).
Against this backdrop reflects on the modes of exclusion of IDP and refugee women and 
queers  in  the  peace  processes  and  their  gendered  and  intersectional  perspectives. 
Therefore, the main criticism of this chapter is the silenced gendered perspectives in the 
19 Tural Ganjaliyev is an Azerbaijani politician who is a Member of the National Assembly of Azerbaijan (VI 
convocation), and has served as Chairman of the Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan since December 2018.
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peace processes. In the upcoming sections, I shall demonstrate how the participants are 
excluded from peace processes by analysing their narratives.
5.3 Processes of exclusion of working-class IDP and refugee women
In this section, I examine how the exclusion of IDP and refugee, and other working-class 
women affected by the NK conflict  in the current peace initiatives is enacted form the 
perspective of the research participants. Two processes are particularly noteworthy: first, 
the  lack  of  accessibility  of  the  peace  initiatives  and  second,  the  idea  of  women’s 
emotionality,  and  IDP  and  refugee  women’s  irrationality  that  tends  to  legitimise  this 
exclusion.  Chapter 3 examined the intersecting challenges of poverty, family status, ill-
health, and discrimination that most of the working-class IDP and refugee women face in 
the wake of their displacement. However, the current peace initiatives were not designed to 
address the practical living conditions so that the women had the possibility to become 
engaged. Anoush recalls:
‘I was a [war] widow with two children, … I needed to find a job, flat, money… 
How could I be involved in peace? I [still] need to take care of my children.  I 
cannot go to meetings, conferences because I am not paid for these things… Who 
would take care of me and my children? Many IDP and refugee women need to 
take care of their children for at least 3-5 years and after this, they have a second 
child… This circle is unstoppable, and in the end the women do not know anything 
about  peacebuilding,  and  they  do  not  believe  in  peace  anymore...  They  didn’t 
consider us and thus, these privileged people represent women like me.’  Anoush, 
Armenian refugee, Dartloch 
Anoush points to the social and economic problems that not only widows with children 
face: the absence of financial means, including the contributions of a husband to family 
income or childcare. She suggests that lack of childcare facilities and other financial means 
prevents  many  working-class  IDP  and  refugee  women  from  ‘go[ing]  to  meetings, 
conferences’ in the current peace process. Their hardship and exclusion from participation 
lead women to lose faith in the very possibility of peace. That is in the promises made over 
the past 30 years of solving the conflict, providing social support and returning people to 
their homelands (see also Shahnazarian, 2014). Economic precarity, fight for basic survival 
is key obstacle to women’s participation and a reason for profound disillusionment. 
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‘You know, on the community  level,  IDP and refugee women have already lost 
many things including her property, husband, children. She is not interested in any 
peace or social development. Her main goal is to survive. Economic stability has 
been  the  key  factor  for  IDP  and  refugee  women.  The  issue  of  peace  and 
peacebuilding is maybe the last  of  her priorities or maybe, she does not know 
about these things’ Tamara, Armenian refugee, Dartloch
Tamara’s  account  suggests how the ‘disinterest’  is  produced through an all-consuming 
quest for basic survival. As I have shown in  chapter 3, IDP and refugee women face a 
severe lack of social  support and access to  healthcare  that  makes their  participation in 
peacebuilding fundamentally impossible. The women’s account suggests that as long as 
IDP  and  refugee  women  do  not  have  access  to  basic  necessities,  financial  security, 
stabilized  living  conditions,  and  healthcare  these  women  will  be  unable  to  join  peace 
initiatives. 
At the same time their exclusion strengthens the participation of (privileged) men in peace 
negotiations.  There are  no differences  in the experiences  of Armenian and Azerbaijani 
women in this respect. It is important to highlight that ,in these accounts, ethnicity is less 
prominent:  gender  and  class  intersect  to  exclude  IDP  and  refugee  women  who  are 
represented in the peace process by privileged heterosexual Armenian and Azerbaijani men 
(see, for example,  Najafizadeh 2013; Selimovic et al.,  2012;  Kvinna till  Kvinna  2019). 
These men do not always come from non-IDP backgrounds and this means privileged IDP 
and refugee men are included in the negotiations on behalf of many working-class IDP and 
refugee  women  (ibid).  Zubeyda  even  suggests  that  women  might  be  deliberate  and 
accounts for the lack of progress:
‘Approaching  the  current  peace  initiatives  from  a  broader  perspective  is 
important…  For  example,  why  don’t  we  see  any  IDP or  refugee  women  from 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, from the working-class? Why[?] did they forget them? 
Can they actually forget them? I believe their exclusion is also a tool and nobody 
cares about these women ...these men from governments who consider themselves 
as ‘peacebuilders’ want to resolve the conflict without any compromises.. Is it that 
hard to compromise on anything?.’ Zubeyda, Azerbaijani IDP, Sumgayit.
Zubeyda implies that working women could be more skilled to compromise which is a 
necessity  for  establishing  lasting  peace  in  the  Nagorno-Karabakh.  This  also  suggests 
gender  is  as  an  important  category  of  peacebuilding  initiatives  because  gendered 
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perspectives  are  different  for men who participate  in these peace processes.  Therefore, 
Zubeyda  highlights  the  role  of  gender  and women’s  compromising  skills  in  the  peace 
resolution.  Together  with  Aydan,  another  Azerbaijani  displaced  woman-Zubeyda,  she 
suggests  that  working-class  IDP  and  refugee  women  are  purposefully  excluded  from 
peacebuilding: their precarious living standards (social support, health care and housing) 
are   not  addressed   to  keep  the  marginalized  groups  out  of  the  negotiations,  perhaps 
because the frozen conflict works well for the current elites of both countries as others 
have argued (see, for example, The Economist 2016; de Waal 2010). Ayunts (2014) argues 
that since the status quo serves the interests of the authorities, the ruling elites do not have 
strong  incentives  to  seek  conflict  resolution.  Bringing  working-class  IDP and  refugee 
women to the negotiations could fundamentally change these dynamics of the negotiations. 
Thus,  the  intersecting  experiences  of  the  working  class  IDP  and  refugee  women  are 
excluded  from  peacebuilding  precisely  because  they  have  a  potential  to  bring  new 
perspectives and outcomes.
The force of gender stereotypes
‘Men are capable of everything... Sometimes, I wonder that if they were, why can 
they not resolve this  conflict  for more than thirty  years. So  either  they are not 
interested in solving the conflict or they are incapable of solving it, It is a problem 
of mindsets [to assume] that men can solve serious issues and women  belong in the 
kitchen...The image of traditional women reproduces gender inequalities not only 
on the individual but also political, social, judicial levels.’ Firuza, Azerbaijani IDP, 
Baku/Italy 
Firuza’s  account  suggests  that  women’s  exclusion in  the  peace  processes  of  the  NK 
conflict is  linked to ideals of gender roles of Armenian and Azerbaijani societies where 
women are assigned to household and childcare, and men take care of the ‘serious issues’. 
In  Caucasian  societies,  this  hierarchical  division  of  labour  associates  women  with 
emotionality and even with irrationality (Shahnazarian, 2017). Firuza’s account suggests 
the close connection of men with personal and public decision-making plays a significant 
role  in  the  NK  peacebuilding  process.  Men  are  considered  rational  and  women  are 
emotional  (Selimovic  et  al.,  2012).  During  interview Firuza  argued also  that  IDP and 
refugee women are less educated which makes them appear ‘irrational’ in Azerbaijani and 
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Armenian societies. Firuza thus considers how the prevalent gender stereotypes underwrite 
the status quo of current peace initiatives both in these societies. 
‘IDP / refugee women of Armenia and Azerbaijan are represented by the privileged 
men  of  our  countries…  Why  should  a  man  represent  my  sad  experiences  and 
trauma instead of me?! Because many women are silenced, and their children are 
tortured in this war….’ Anoush, Armenian refugee, Dartloch
Participants’ accounts suggest that these men, many of whom are from higher middle class 
include privileged some IDP and refugee men to speak on behalf of all working-class IDP 
and  refugees.  Here,  gender  status  of  these  women  trumps  ethnicity  because  IDP  and 
refugee women, like Anoush and Firuza are represented in the peace process by privileged 
upper-class heterosexual Armenian and Azerbaijani men. As I introduced, women are seen 
as inferior and it is promoted, they are incapable of solving such issues because of their  
emotionality.  Thus,  ethnicity  becomes  refracted  by gender  and this  shows how gender 
comes into play when the participants talk about their exclusion by these privileged men. 
Anoush  suggests  that  men  are  not  capable  of  representing  IDP  and  refugee  women, 
especially working-class, because they have not gone through the challenges and traumas 
which IDP and refugee women faced. Not only Anoush and Firuza but many IDP and 
refugee women are silenced for many years. Ethnicity becomes backgrounded as women 
highlight the role of gender relations and stereotypes in peace initiatives – even though 
research participants question the ability of men to represent. IDP and refugee women’s 
experiences  and  potential  for  resolving  the  conflict,  how  to  facilitate  the  women’s 
participation and a more adequate representation of precarity, discrimination, ill-health and 
sexual violence will be addressed below. 
Non-essentialist approaches to peacebuilding
It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  not  all  research  participants  thought  that  simply 
encouraging women’s participation will change the dynamics of peacebuilding. Consider 
the account of Aydan, who had been active in peacekeeping for many years:
Peacebuilding  becomes  very  mechanical  nowadays.  It  is  like  a  doctor’s 
prescription, if you take this pill you’ll feel better.  However, peacebuilding takes 
years and sometimes decades and centuries...  I  don’t not think that considering 
gender as the most an important category in peacebuilding is the right thing to do. 
We should approach it more holistically. If we do not have this approach it can 
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cause  troubles  for  peacebuilding  in  future… Unfortunately,  in  the  negotiations 
process,  you  only  can  find  only  male  politicians  from  Russia,  Armenia  and 
Azerbaijan.  Nobody else is involved in this and there is no outcome...  I should 
mention that liberal feminists claim we should empower women in each field... But 
I  do  not  think  we  should  empower  women  in  peacebuilding  who  support 
militarization like these men who are so-called peacebuilders… We should invite 
people who are really interested in the process of conflict resolution.’ Aydan, 32, 
Azerbaijani IDP woman, Baku/Switzerland
Aydan is one of the first generations of young peacebuilders from the region. She supports 
a ‘holistic’ processual and non-essentialist approach towards peacebuilding where women 
should  not  simply  participate  because  they  are  women  but  in  view  of  what  they  can 
contribute. Aydan implies that women who support the increased militarization of society 
like  their  male  counterparts  should  not  be  empowered.  Aydan’s  account  suggests  that 
many peacebuilders  participate  in the negotiations  even though they support  a military 
solution of the NK conflict. This does not invalidate but underlines the plea for including 
IDP and refugee women, however, who often bear the consequences of militarisation and 
who need to be included in large enough numbers precisely because their experiences are 
not singular. The argument about the non-innocence of subjugated positions suggests that 
it is not that all refugee women naturally oppose military but that their experiences make 
them less likely to support militarisation (as we have seen with the reluctance of women to 
send their boys to war in chapter 3). Precisely because of variance among IDP and refugee 
women, they have to be included in meaningful numbers. If they had a singular perspective 
this could be represented by a single woman – or man for this matter. Here the suggestion 
that only those really interested in peacebuilding should not obfuscate the fact that many 
IDP and refugee women are not able to develop and articulate their interest on account of 
their living conditions. Any sustained interest in peace has to be actively enabled as part of 
peacebuilding itself. Precisely because gender and ethnicity are not essentialist categories, 
is  it  important  that  a  variety  of  differently  located  women  be  involved  in  the  peace 
negotiations to bring varied perspectives to inform peacebuilding. 
Even though  Aydan appeared to reject the representation of IDP and refugee women as 
such, she  endorsed  the  role  of  quota  system as  a  means  to  include   IDP and refugee 
women’s participation in peacebuilding. This suggests that IDP and refugee women are 
best considered as a heterogeneous group with many critical perspectives, as my research 
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highlighted (chapter 3). Therefore, a quota system might contribute to including different 
intersecting experiences. For Aydan, quotas are merely a short-term solution and need to 
be  complemented  by  consciousness-raising.  Aydan  suggested  consciousness-raising 
between and among working-class IDP and refugee women can empower them to develop 
their own understanding of peacebuilding.  In this sense,  consciousness-raising is not re-
education but an enabling of women to trust and develop their own analyses together.  By 
sharing  their  personal  stories  and  helping  each  other,  they  can  change  the  solid 
understanding of the male-dominated peacebuilding. Therefore, Aydan highlighted the role 
of grassroots movements and working-class IDP and refugee women peace activists, as 
well as peer educators and teachers as role models.
To sum up, two main obstacles emerge on practical and symbolic levels that need to be 
addressed  together:  women’s  day  to  day  quest  for  the  survival  and  prevalent  gender 
stereotypes whereby men are better able to solve the current conflict. Redesigning  viable 
peacebuilding initiatives on the NK conflict  requires a more contextualised understanding 
of how the inclusion of IDP and refugee women in peacebuilding that takes into account 
accessibility  and  participation  both  practically  (enabling  conditions  such  as  childcare, 
transportation,  healthcare)  as  well  as   institutional  quotas  to  increase  participation  and 
destabilise pervasive gender stereotypes that – as the women point out – are disproven by 
the  very  lack  of  tangible  progress.  Therefore,  as  highlighted  above,  is  it  important  to 
provide a heterogeneity of differently located IDP and refugee women for being involved 
in the peace negotiations in order to bring varied perspectives to inform peacebuilding.
5.4 Processes of exclusion of members of the LGBT/queer community 
Conflict and displacement constitute layers of vulnerability also for LGBT/queer-identified 
individuals  from Armenia,  Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh who as I have shown in 
chapter 4 facing pervasive discrimination and hatred.  In this section, I analyse the views of 
research participants on their exclusion from peace initiatives in relation to the persistent 
association of queerness with pathology and the fear of queer individuals. As I have shown 
in the previous chapter 4, in Armenian and Azerbaijani societies, LGBT/queer individuals 
are  often considered  an aberration  (Dadashzadeh and Paitjan,  2020) since they do not 
appear  to  engage  in  the  pronatalist  policies.  According  to  Armenian  transgender  Lilit 
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queers are perceived as being ‘incapable of making rational choices’, an argument used 
against their participation in peacebuilding.
‘In  Armenia,  the  queer  community  is  not  seen  as  rational  individuals  and 
unfortunately,  they  are  considered  mentally  ill  Armenian  society  thinks  LGBT 
individuals  cannot help solving the NK conflict  because they first  need to solve 
their own ‘mental problem’. Their mental problem being LGBT and not following 
the  traditional  values  of  Armenian  society...’  Lilit,  46,  middle-class,  Armenian 
transgender, Yerevan
As Lilit argued queer individuals’ mental illness is a product of the heteronormativity and 
the hatred of LGBT/queer as shown in chapter 4. Here the notion of ‘incapable of making 
rational  choices’  is  associated  with the issue of  sexuality  and thus,  queers are  seen as 
mentally sick. This suggests that LGBT/queerness is considered pathology (see, chapter 4). 
Because  of  the  non-reproductive  partnerships  and  the  promoted  pronatalist  policies, 
Armenian  and  Azerbaijani  societies  consider  it  as  ‘illness’.  The  queer  community  is 
excluded  because  of  their  assumed  ‘mental  illness’  and  inferiority  [specifically 
irrationality] that contrasts with the superior ‘rationality’ accorded to male peacebuilders 
and  their  heteronormative  identities.  LGBT/Queers  might  not  be  included  by  women 
peacebuilders either as Eldar observed:
‘There  are  many  privileged  women  peacebuilders  who  do  not  imagine  queer 
individuals in the peacebuilding process. The ‘illness’ of queer individuals is also 
perceived (by privileged women) as a barrier for them to participate in the current 
peace initiative.’ Eldar, Azerbaijani queer, Baku.
Eldar’s observations amplify Lilit’s claim of queer abjection in Armenian and Azerbaijani 
societies. Even this allegedly privileged women peacebuilders might not aim to include the 
queer individuals  in the peace processes because of the manipulation against the queer 
identities.  These  suggest  that  abjection  and  manipulation  obscure  the  violence, 
pathologization and exclusion. Vardan highlighted that women peacebuilders already are, 
considered  marginal  figures  in  the  negotiations  process  because  they  are  minority  and 
Hayk had claimed that many supported the militarization underwriting the male-dominated 
peacebuilding  process.  The  perspectives  of  these  minoritized  women  of  queers  in 
peacebuilding  might,  therefore,  be  shaped  through  male  and  heteronormative  lenses. 
Together, the pathologization against queer community is produced through the traditional 
understanding of heteronormativity in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this process, hegemonic 
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masculinities  are  considered  decision-makers  and  thus,  they  have  already  labelled 
queerness as ‘mental sickness’. Consequently, the male-dominated peace process kept the 
queer community out of the peace processes. Therefore,  on the first  level LGBT/queer 
community is considered ‘non-contributory’ subjects for the resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.
The second level of analysis focuses on the fear of queers within the peace processes. 
Leyla told me that some peacebuilders think that LGBT/queer empowerment can cause a 
serious problem of loss of trust) in the peacebuilding process for many citizens in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan.  The research  participants  argued that  the inclusion  of queers  in  peace 
processes is  supported only by pro-western peace  activists  and organisations.  Consider 
Hayk’s account:
‘Queer people’s involvement is seen as problematic and queers are excluded [in 
peace  initiatives]  because  of  the  irrational  fear  against  them… Many men and 
privileged women peacebuilders think if queers are involved in this process, people 
will hate peacebuilding even more…. But I believe that people will get used to the 
visibility  of  queers in each part of  life,  especially  in  the peace process if  these 
‘peacebuilders’  stop  the  manipulation  against  us.’  Hayk,  Armenian  queer, 
Netherlands
Hayk  considered  that  Armenian  and  Azerbaijani  peacebuilders  actively  manipulated 
citizens’ thoughts so as to not include the queer community in the peace processes. This 
suggests that there is a strong anti-queer propaganda within the peace processes, which 
both feeds of and reinforces the hatred and homophobia on the societal level. Homophobic 
mindsets (Carroll and Quinn, 2009) are fuelled by the idea of ‘mental illness’ of queers. As 
one of the privileged women peacebuilders and former Ombudsman of Azerbaijan, Elmira 
Suleymanova, emphasised, ‘I don’t think that it [homosexuality, ed.] is normal. The roles 
of the sexes are defined by nature (…) This will be a general view of most from my country, 
though we never discuss this issue’ (The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2011, p. 5). 
As an Ombudsman and peacebuilder, she discriminated against the rights of people whom 
she should have defended. This suggests the ‘fear’ against queers is socially constructed in 
the discourses (also in chapter 4) of the state officials through hate speech. Because of this 
propaganda, people comprehend ‘queerness’ as a problematic category and, therefore, the 
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inclusion  of  LGBT/queer  community  in  the  peacebuilding  activities  and  initiatives 
becomes a challenge within Armenian and Azerbaijani societies. 
To  sum,  exclusion  of  queer  community  emerges  on  two  mutually  reinforcing  levels- 
mental illness and fear of queers that undergird their exclusion from the peace processes . 
The  accounts  of  LGBT/queer  research participants  suggest  that  they  contribute  critical 
societal  analysis and an alternative vision of peace to the peace processes in ways that 
challenge  heteronormativity  of  Armenian  and  Azerbaijani  societies.  In  particular 
LGBT/queer identified people tend to emphasise an anti-militarist perspective and endorse 
a diminishing of the role of the military in the NK conflict. The involvement of queers in 
the peace process will not only contribute to resolving the conflict but also increases the 
visibility  of queer community.  The visibility  of queers may help to dismantle  ideas  of 
mental illness, pathology  and ’fear’ against queer community. Therefore, the inclusion and 
representation of queers in the peace process play a vital role for the queer community of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
5.5 Conclusion: Towards a re-designed peacebuilding
An intersectional approach to peacebuilding is vital when considering that working-class 
IDP  and  refugee  women,  LGBT/queer  peacebuilders/mediators  and  minoritized  ethnic 
groups  are  still  persistently  excluded  not  only  in  the  official  negotiations  in  the  NK 
conflict. An intersectional approach is concerned with how to increase the participation of 
these marginalized people in the peace process of the ongoing NK conflict. It reflects a 
mono-axial or superficial understanding of ethnicity and gender, which ignore the presence 
of heterogeneous group of people which include IDP and refugee women and LGBT/queer 
community (see, chapter 1.5). Ledreach (2020) suggests that ‘an intersectional lens brings 
into  sharp  relief  the  ways  in  which  gendered,  territorial,  ethnic  and  generational 
experiences of violence shape everyday practices of peacebuilding’ (p.201).  Therefore, 
such  intersectional  approach  in  peacebuilding  helps  to  unravel  the  power  hierarchies 
between marginalized and privileged groups who rule the peacebuilding initiatives.
The intersectional perspective can be different in the context of each conflict because of 
the historical development, the roots of conflict and other relevant reasons. In the context 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the notion of intersectionality in peacebuilding should 
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refer  to  including  a  wider  range  of  people  (mainly,  IDP  and  refugee  women  and 
LGBT/queer community) as peacebuilders and only after this engagement, expanding and 
redesigning the initiatives and actions can be seen as the further steps. 
Building  on  Lederach,  Stefanie  Kappler  and  Nicolas  Lemay-Hébert (chapter  1.5),  an 
intersectional perspective holds that subject positions of peacebuilders are shaped by their 
experiences  and shape the perspectives  and stakes  of dialogue and negotiation  [e.g.  in 
relation  to  militarisation]  and  that  therefore  more  varied  subject  positions  have  to  be 
included. Intersectional peacebuilding both takes account of critical research that shows 
inclusion of different group of marginalized people and variety of subjects in the peace 
processes contribute to establishing more  heterogeneous and inclusionary peacebuilding 
practices  and it  helps opening  up how  such subject  positions  can bring new insights 
(including their gender, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic and IDP or refugee status) during 
and after the conflict. An intersectional approach can also help to develop the inter-ethnic 
intersectional collaboration among the women and queers of the region including Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia. This can contribute to the exchanges between 
and among these marginalized group of people with the support of intersectional approach 
in peacebuilding (see, for example, Selimovic et al 2012). Peacebuilding, in the context of 
NK conflict, should, however, not only be a matter of technical implementation of steps of 
judicial  and  legal  change  but  should  become  a  broader  effort  that  aims  towards  less 
violence  and  more  social  cohesion  and  inclusivity  of  queer  community  and  IDP  and 
refugee women in the current peace initiatives.
Enabling participation of queers and IDP and refugee women means that institutions and 
actors  responsible  for  the  current  peace  initiatives  need  to  change  to  become  more 
inclusionary. This inclusion contributes to consideration of the needs and views of queers 
and  IDP  and  refugee  women  which  brings  new  insights  to  the  peace  processes. 
Intersectional  awareness helps to curb male dominance in  the peace process and gives 
more space for representation and involvement of IDP and refugee women and queers by 
creating  more  sustainable  and  equal  peace  initiatives  for  all  the  citizens.  By  way  of 
conclusion, I propose the following  four suggestions that can contribute to re-designing 
the peace process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
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First,  improving the  material  living  conditions  of  IDP and refugee  women  is  the  key 
priority for IDP and refugee women and LGBT/queer community to participate in local 
and particularly centralised meeting, conferences and summits. According to the research 
participants  that  includes  basic  employment,  housing  childcare,  healthcare  and  social 
support.  The UN report  ‘2004 report  of  the  Secretary-General  on Women,  Peace  and 
Security’ (2004) highlights the importance of human and financial support to help women 
participants  are  considered  the  top  priorities  for  empowering  women  in  the  peace 
initiatives – so a budget to enable this. 
 
To support the participation of IDP and refugee women’s, queers’ and minoritized ethnic 
group like Lezgins peace processes, financial and logistical assistance should be provided 
by governments, civil society and international organizations. The increase of the financial 
support  for  attending  the  international  and local  peace  meetings  should  be  prioritized. 
Many of my IDP and refugee women respondents do not have enough financial income to 
attend such informal and formal meetings by covering the transport, hotel, meal costs and 
thus,  they  become  excluded  from  the  current  peace  initiatives.  Further,  one  of  the 
prominent  concerns of the redesign process is taking the ill-health  of refugee and IDP 
women into account. The improvements concern an accessible healthcare system for these 
women; subsidies for these women’s medical check-ups; to ensure the safety and health 
situation. Additionally, informal networks or assistance such as childcare, transportation 
and accommodation can help working-class women tackle these challenges. Therefore, the 
regular childcare facilities should be arranged for these IDP and refugee women who aim 
to join these peace processes. This shows how their intersectional identities (working-class, 
women  and  IDP/refugee)  play  an  exclusionary  role  in  practice  and  in  the  end,  such 
exclusion directly influences the dynamics of the NK conflict. The queer community also 
needs to be visible within peace process and thus should also receive financial support for 
attending these events. As long as queers do not get such economic support, they will be 
unable to join the peace processes because they also have unemployment problems in these 
countries (see, chapter 4). 
The  intersectional  discrimination  (women,  queer,  working-class,  widow,  mother, 
IDP/refugee)  against  these  groups  increases  the  discouragement  of  IDP  and  refugee 
women and LGBT/queer community for participating in these negotiations.  Also, a space 
for  articulating  these  different  experiences  so  that  they  can  meaningfully  inform  the 
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dialogues and negotiations. This is not only intersectional awareness in peace processes of 
NK conflict; rather, it will be an auction of the ending of male-dominated peace initiatives 
and  giving  more  space  for  IDP  and  refugee  women  and  queers  by  creating  more 
sustainable and equal peace processes. 
 
Second,  to  widely  publicise  and  prepare  open  and  secure  environments  for  IDP  and 
refugee women and LGBT/queers to articulate and share experiences that can then inform 
other people about the presence of these peacebuilders within the process. This will allow 
them to become a part of the peace processes because many research participants did not 
have information about the current peace initiatives. Thus, exclusionary environments did 
not let IDP and refugee women and queers develop their credible and leader personalities 
because they were not allowed to show their  rational  strengths.  It  is  also important  to 
highlight that emotionality of these women (which is not accepted by the current male-
dominated peace initiatives) will also allow them to express their needs and concerns in 
these  peacebuilding  initiatives.  The  intersectional  perspective  does  not  analyse  this  as 
‘emotionality versus rationality’ and it mainly targets the fluidity and multidimensionality 
of these concepts together. For IDP and refugee women respondents, topics such as sexual 
violence and ill-health were unspoken and providing a secure environment for them may 
help to talk about these topics without fear. This can be organized by following the several 
circles but firstly, it should start with smaller groups which mean IDP and refugee women 
or LGBT/queer community should initiate these conversations among themselves. Over 
time, they can reach larger groups after having a clear agenda. From the perspectives of the 
queer community, it can help queers to openly introduce themselves to the working-class 
IDP and refugee women to develop solidarity in these peace processes. Therefore, IDP and 
refugee women and queers need to set up their own peace fora to increase their leadership 
and get access to the peace processes in the context of the NK conflict. 
 
Third, to consciousness-raising among IDP and refugee women and queers can enhance 
their active participation in the current peace processes. The main aim of consciousness-
raising is to show to many working-class IDP and refugee women that as long as they do 
not raise their voices, nobody will solve the NK conflict.  People who are responsible for 
such consciousness-raising should be IDP and refugee women and LGBT/queer citizens of 
Armenia,  Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh who can start the grassroots movement of 
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these communities. Through sharing and seeing the structural dimensions of the current 
peacebuilding, these marginalized groups can develop the new notion of peacebuilding for 
the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  In  the  small  groups,  IDP  and  refuge  women  and 
LGBT/queer individuals can organize the events and gatherings in order to share their own 
experiences  and stories  which  can  help  them to  understand the  role  of  consciousness-
raising in the peacebuilding. Thus, the consciousness-raising process must be organized as 
a grassroots movement by local communities, activists and peacebuilders which consists of 
working-class  IDP  and  refugee  women  and  LGBT/queers.  Therefore,  establishing 
consciousness-raising  groups  at  local  level  among  these  marginalized  groups  will 
contribute to theorising/politicising the problemacity of current peace initiatives of the NK 
conflict. This will contribute to understanding experiences differently and increasing their 
leadership in the peace processes and secondly,  developing collective understanding of 
peace  beyond  the  resolution  of  conflicts  such  as  hatred  relations  of  Armenians  and 
Azerbaijanis, discussions over cultural hegemony and others. 
 
Fourth, introducing a quota system is an important step towards including more IDP and 
refugee women and queers and minoritized ethnic people in the peace processes. The basic 
premise of the quota system in the peacebuilding activities is to provide IDP and refugee 
women’s and queers’ representation at all levels and aspects of the current peace initiatives 
(usually within a set period of time). Active participation through the legislation provides 
more coherent and less challenging empowerment. Introduction of such strict measurement 
should become a part of the national conventions in Armenia and Azerbaijan and this can 
help to change the misperceptions of the society about the queer community and IDP and 
refugee women. The active representation can be achieved through the equal conditions 
and quota system can contribute to closing the existing gap. This suggests that the quota 
system can allow IDP and refugee women and queers to be politically involved in the 
current peace processes and actively participate in them. However, quotas are not long-




This  thesis  posed  four  interconnected  questions:  first,  in  what  ways  are  the  lives  of 
Armenian,  Azerbaijani  and  Karabakh  displaced  women  differentially  impacted  by  the 
ongoing conflict?  Second,  does  the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict influence the lives of the 
LGBT/queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan? Third, why and how  are  IDP and 
refugee  women  and  LGBT/queer  community  excluded  from the  current  peacebuilding 
initiatives?  And  fourth,  how  does  the  peace  process  have  to  be  re-imagined  and  re-
designed  to  take  the  intersectional  experiences  and  positionalities  of  IDP and  refugee 
women and queer community into account? 
In the state of art, I analysed the existing literature in relation to the concepts of gender, 
ethnicity,  peacebuilding  and  intersectionality.  As  the  key  concepts,  I  used  Stanley 
Tambiah’s  definition  together  with  Fredrik  Barth’s  understanding  of  ethnicity  which 
claimed ethnic identities are the social constructions of the societies. In relation to gender, I 
considered  different  authors  including  Nona  Shahnazarian,  Mehrangiz  Najafizadeh, 
Kvinna till Kvinna team to understand the gendered relations in the South Caucasus by 
highlighting  the  colonial  history of  the region.  Regarding intersectionality,  I  employed 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality which helped to uncover the interwoven 
relations  of  gender,  ethnicity,  class,  age  and  other  relevant  issues  in  the  context  of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Finally,  for peacebuilding I developed the methodology by 
drawing on the works of Angela Lederach, Stefanie Kappler and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert 
which elaborated on the importance of the intersectional approach in the peace processes. 
The literature review highlighted both the gender system is very oppressive in the male-
dominated South Caucasian societies and suggested performative conceptions of politics of 
ethnicity,  gender  and  sexuality  and  proposed  intersectionality  as  the  enabling  tool  for 
deeply understanding and interconnectedly analysing these issues without reducing one to 
another.
I  proceeded  with  the  methodology  chapter  and  a  qualitative  research  design  with 
qualitative  interviews  conducted  in  a  range  of  venues  was  chosen  to  examine  these 
questions. While little participation of peace activists, 15 interviews were conducted with 
refugee and IDP women and LGBT/queers, currently living in Armenia and Azerbaijan. I 
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showed how my researcher positionality influenced dynamics of the research process and 
how some of my respondents approached me suspiciously and differently. This directly 
influenced the research findings in many ways.
In chapter 3, I analysed the IDP and refugee women’s lives by focusing on the interviews 
and  participant  observation  and,  my  research  findings  were  interconnected  with  the 
precarious  living  conditions  of my respondents.  The research showed that  NK conflict 
caused precarious changes in the living conditions of IDP and refugee women and the 
interaction of different axes of inequalities fostered these massive changes. In the analysis, 
I  uncovered  how  the  ethnicity  was  differently  configured  in  different  situations  by 
considering  the ‘urban women versus rural  women’ distinctions.  Gender  also refracted 
ethnicity in many situations, and this suggested how the gender order in the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani  societies  put  women  in  inferior  positions.  Gender  and  ethnicity  were 
constituted in and through cultural discrimination, socioeconomic challenges, state support, 
ethnic  privilege,  ill-health,  which  also  shaped  perspectives  on  militarization  and  the 
inability to talk about the sexual violence with me. Therefore, Armenian and Azerbaijani 
IDP  and  refugee  women  participants’  lives  were  highly  influenced  from the  ongoing 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In chapter 4, I elaborated on the mutual relations between queer community in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan and the militarization of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and I examined the 
impact of the militarization due to this conflict on the lives of queers. One of the important  
findings was that the oppressive militarized system of these countries identity queers as 
pathological or ‘mentally sick’ and they are exempted from the mandatory military service. 
However, concerning their employment, the completion of mandatory military service is 
required and most of the workplaces require such documentation. This uncovered how the 
militarization influence economic stability of LGBT/queer community and therefore, these 
individuals face the oppression on multi-layered levels. Except economic conditions, the 
pronatalist  nationalist  idea(ls)  of  population  growth  which  NK  conflict  strengthened 
fostered discriminations and pathologizing of LGBT/queer community in the Armenian 
and Azerbaijani  societies.  Consequently,  such discriminations  have been increasing the 
hate against the community and therefore, many LGBT/queer individuals remain invisible 
in these societies. 
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The last chapter examined processes of exclusion and provided crucial suggestions. Here I 
showed  the  current  male-dominated  resolution  processes  and  the  exclusionary  politics 
against  of  IDP  and  refugee  women  and  queers  from  Armenia  and  Azerbaijan.  The 
exclusion  of  IDP  and  refugee  women  on  practical  and  symbolic  levels  and  queer 
community  because  of  pathologization  and  fear  kept  them  out  of  the  current  peace 
processes. Some of the key conclusions that can be drawn from this study are that working-
class  IDP and  refugee  women  cannot  realise  their  capacity  to  contribute  to  the  peace 
processes due to ill-health problems, childcare and economic responsibilities. This suggests 
how marginalized  women consider  themselves  as  economically  unavailable  to  join  the 
peace process. The current peace process does not allow these women to be involved in 
these processes as the equal citizens of Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the inclusion of 
these marginalized experiences requires re-designed peace processes by taking the needs of 
these groups into account. Thus, I proposed four suggestions which include the economic 
support for these marginalized groups of people; widely publicising and preparing open 
and  secure  environments;  doing  consciousness-raising  activities  among  the  IDP  and 
refugee women and LGBT/queer community as a grassroots movement; and finally, setting 
up  special  quota  for  empowering  these  underprivileged  groups  of  people  in  the 
peacebuilding initiatives. 
My study also had crucial limitations and thus, I would like to focus on them and propose 
suggestions  for  the  future  research.  My  sampling  included  only  limited  number  of 
participants due to the time limitations and effects of research positionality such as being 
queer Azerbaijani non-IDP researcher. Research would benefit from collaborative multi-
gender,  multi-ethnic  cooperation  to  allow  access  to  the  territories  of  Armenia  and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, the collaboration of Armenian and Azerbaijani researchers on 
collecting  the  qualitative  data  of  IDP and refugee  women’s  life  stories  can  enrich  the 
current study. Since in the existing literature the IDP and refugee women are promoted as a 
homogenous group, in further research, strengthening the heterogeneous image of IDP and 
refugee  women  should  be  explicitly  promoted  by  researchers.  Concerning  the  queer 
community,  I  would  encourage  more  researchers  to  join  the  examine  the  mutual 
connections between NK conflict and queer community in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In my 
interviews, I had only a limited number of participants and thus, the inclusion of more 
queer  perspectives  can  contribute  to  showing  an  analysis  more  focused  on  ethnicity, 
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different  generations  and  the  impacts  of  the  NK conflict  on  their  lives.  Additionally, 
accessing  the  official  data  on  exemptions  of  queers  from  mandatory  military  service 
through the national  archives and Ministry of Defence in Armenia and Azerbaijan can 
enrich future research since this topic remains under-researched. 
In  relation  to  the  peace  processes,  I  would  suggest  conducting  interviews  with  more 
peacebuilders  and  the  specific  peace  organizations  and  their  agendas  of  intersectional 
approach in peacebuilding. To connect with the current negotiators of OSCE Minsk Group 
from Armenia and Azerbaijan will also bring more insights about their plans of including 
marginalized experiences. Since I could not reach these privileged negotiators because of 
lack of connections,  I suggest future researchers connect these negotiators by attending 
special events and organizational meetings. The importance of the intersectional approach 
in peacebuilding is a provocation: not (only) to take into account a set of subject positions 
and  relations  of  power   already  known but  being  open  and  designing  conditions  that 
examine the differences and differentiations that emerge and yet have to be examined in 
the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict.  Therefore,  the  intersectional  perspective  should  be 
enrichened in the future research by considering the life stories of underprivileged subjects 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
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